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THE SEARCH FOR MORE FAIRNESS IN THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Elwin Griffith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years have elapsed since Congress passed the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").' In 1977, Congress in-
troduced a framework for controlling the conduct of debt collec-
tors, since there was ample evidence that collectors were engag-
ing in some questionable practices.2 Debt collectors were often
successful in their assignments because many consumers suc-
cumbed to their aggressive collection tactics rather than deal
with a litany of unsettling contacts.3 There was little state legis-
* Tallahassee Alumni Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A., 1960, Long Is-
land University; J.D., 1963, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1964, New York University.
1. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)).
2. A Senate Committee reported as follows:
Hearings before the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee revealed that independ-
ent debt collectors are the prime source of egregious collection practices.
While unscrupulous debt collectors comprise only a small segment of the in-
dustry, the suffering and anguish which they regularly inflict is substantial.
Unlike creditors, who generally are restrained by the desire to protect their
good will when collecting past due accounts, independent collectors are likely
to have no future contact with the consumer and often are unconcerned with
the consumer's opinion of them. Collection agencies generally operate on a 50-
percent commission, and this has too often created the incentive to collect by
any means.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
3. A former debt collector gave his views about industry practice:
The debt collectors feel that their job is not to find out if the money is owed
but rather to collect the money, and as long as the deadbeat approach exists
in the debt collection industry, you are going to have abuses. I know that in
many, many cases there are legitimate disputes and that some debts are not
really owed. But a debt collector who takes time to figure out if debts are
owed instead of just collecting them will soon be unemployed.
The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 27 (1977) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of William R. Mann, former debt collector, Suitland, Md.).
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lation in place to restrict collectors, and thus collectors had many
opportunities to run rampant in the marketplace.4
In drafting its legislation, Congress had to protect consumers
from deceptive practices without unduly restricting the remedies
of debt collectors.5 This was a delicate balance indeed. Even
though this legislation has been in place for a long time, there is
room for argument about how well it operates. Collectors would
probably argue that the statute places too many restrictions on
them, while consumers probably think that there are not enough.6
When all is said and done, collectors still have more than ade-
quate means of collecting their debts. The restrictions in place re-
late more to the collectors' methods of operation.7 There is much
to be said for improving the statute in ways that allow consumers
to have more flexibility in reacting to collectors' demands.
This article will first discuss the validation notice that a collec-
tor must give to a consumer either in its initial communication, or
within five days thereafter.' This notice has caused problems be-
4. A Senate Committee expressed the need for the legislation as follows:
The primary reason why debt collection abuse is so widespread is the lack of
meaningful legislation on the State level.
While 37 States and the District of Columbia do have laws regulating
debt collectors, only a small number are comprehensive statutes which pro-
vide a civil remedy. As an example of ineffective State laws, of the 16 states
which regulate by debt collection boards, 12 require by law that a majority of
the board be comprised of debt collectors.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2.
5. The purpose of the FDCPA "is to protect consumers from a host of unfair, harass-
ing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on
ethical debt collectors." Id. at 1-2.
6. The FDCPA contains only sixteen sections, nine of which impose certain stan-
dards of conduct on a debt collector. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o.
7. See id.
8. See infra Parts II-III. The validation section provides as follows:
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connec-
tion with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following
information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has
paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing-
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after re-
ceipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion
thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writ-
ing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is
disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy
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cause even as collectors continue their collection efforts, they
must give consumers information about their right to dispute and
seek the verification of the debt within thirty days.9 The result is
that many collectors are unable to maintain the delicate balance
between demanding payment and emphasizing the consumer's
right to challenge the debt.' ° This article will suggest a solution to
this dilemma that respects the rights of collectors and consumers,
while allowing the validation notice to do its work."
This article will also address how the statute can clarify the
collector's obligation to cease communication when the consumer
so requests, 2 and to stop collection activities when the consumer
of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the
name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
9. The Senate Committee indicated the importance of the validation provision:
Another significant feature of this legislation is its provision requiring the
validation of debts. After initially contacting a consumer, a debt collector
must send him or her written notice stating the name of the creditor and the
amount owed. If the consumer disputes the validity of the debt within 30
days, the debt collector must cease collection until he sends the consumer
verification.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4.
10. A debt collector must effectively convey the notice to the consumer. See Swanson
v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). Many problems have been
caused by the collector's demand for payment within less than thirty days, while giving
the consumer notice of his right to dispute the debt within thirty days. See Bartlett v.
Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131
(4th Cir. 1996); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
11. The FDCPA currently requires a collector to cease collection activities only if the
consumer disputes the debt, and then only until the collector verifies the debt or obtains a
copy of a judgment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). The Seventh Circuit explained that "[tihe
debt collector is perfectly free to sue within thirty days; he just must cease his efforts at
collection during the interval between being asked for verification of the debt and mailing
the verification to the debtor." Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501; see also Smith v. Computer
Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999). The Federal Trade Commission has
agreed with the courts in its Official Staff Commentary. See Federal Trade Commission
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation: Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,109 (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter FTC Com-
mentary]. The FTC staff uses the Commentary to give its interpretations of the FDCPA.
Id. at 50,101. However, the Commentary does not have the force of statutory provisions
and does not bind the Commission or the public. Id.
12. The FDCPA sets out the collector's obligation as follows:
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to
pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further
communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate
further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except-
20031
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disputes the debt, at least until the collector can verify it."3 If a
collector's activities are frozen for a certain period after the initial
communication, some problems would be obviated. 4 It will be
suggested that the collector should go further and inform the con-
sumer of the options available to him. 5
Finally, there will be a review of the provision relating to a col-
lector's misleading and deceptive statements. 6 This review will
show that many of the problems that arise in this context relate
to the collector's drive to succeed with its collection efforts, while
complying with the statutory requirements for the validation no-
tice. 17 The statute can remove the difficulty inherent in the collec-
tor's attempt to reconcile the two matters. Many cases show that
(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are
being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke
specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector
or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or
creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.
If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be com-
plete upon receipt.
15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2000).
13. See id. § 1692g(b) (2000).
14. There would be no conflict about whether the thirty-day statutory period is a
grace period within which the collector cannot pursue the consumer or a dispute period
during which the consumer can request verification of the debt. For this strategy to work,
the collector would be restricted to giving the basic details about the debt with the valida-
tion notice in the initial communication, without making any demands. The collector
would be spared the agony of having to draft language that motivates the consumer to
pay, while at the same time conveying effectively the right to dispute the debt. See Savino
v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir, 1998); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 497; Terran v.
Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
15. Although the FDCPA requires the debt collector to cease collection while it is veri-
fying the debt, there is no statutory requirement for the collector to notify the consumer
that such an event will occur if the consumer disputes the debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
The same may be said about the collector's obligation to cease communication at the con-
sumer's request. See id. § 1692c(c) (2000). The consumer would be in a much stronger posi-
tion if he knew that he could issue a "cease communication" directive to the collector. The
collector can inform the consumer about that without much difficulty.
16. See infra Part VI.A. The FDCPA provides that "[a] debt collector may not use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt." Id. § 1692e (2000). The section then gives sixteen examples of conduct that is in
violation thereof. See id.
17. See United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996); Russell v.
Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996); Greer v. Shapiro & Kreisman, 152 F. Supp. 2d
679 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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collectors fail in their mission to make the necessary reconcilia-
tion.." This article suggests how this problem can be solved.
II. THE VALIDATION NOTICE
A. The Statutory Obligation
The FDCPA contains a significant provision that requires a
debt collector to obtain verification of any debt that a consumer
disputes in writing. 9 It is understandable that Congress wanted
18. In Bartlett v. Heibl, the court recognized that "it is possible to devise a form of
words that will inform the debtor of the risk of his being sued without detracting from the
statement of his statutory rights." 128 F.3d at 501. The court provided an example of a
"safe harbor" letter that would protect collectors in the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 501-02. It is
significant that in that letter the court went beyond the statutory requirements by sug-
gesting that the collector should notify the consumer that if the consumer requested proof
of the debt, the collector would suspend its collection efforts until it satisfied the con-
sumer's request. Id. at 502. So even though the "safe harbor" letter contained both the col-
lector's demand for payment and the statutory validation notice, it also made clear that
the consumer's demand for proof of the debt would put a temporary halt on the collector's
activities. See id. at 501-02. The "safe harbor" letter in Bartlett reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Bartlett:
I have been retained by Micard Services to collect from you the entire bal-
ance, which as of September 25, 1995, was $1,656.90, that you owe Micard
Services on your MasterCard Account ....
If you want to resolve this matter without a lawsuit, you must, within one
week of the date of this letter, either pay Micard $316 against the balance
that you owe (unless you've paid it since your last statement) or call Mi-
card.., and work out arrangements. for payment with it. If you do neither of
these things, I will be entitled to file a lawsuit against you, for the collection
of this debt, when the week is over.
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute
the validity of the debt or any part of it. If you don't dispute it within that pe-
riod, I'll assume that it's valid. If you do dispute it-by notifying me in writ-
ing to that effect-I will, as required by the law, obtain and mail to you proof
of the debt. And if, within the same period, you request in writing the name
and address of your original creditor, if the original creditor is different from
the current creditor (Micard Services), I will furnish you with that informa-
tion too.
The law does not require me to wait until the end of the thirty-day period
before suing you to collect this debt. If, however, you request proof of the debt
or the name and address of the original creditor within the thirty-day period
that begins with your receipt of this letter, the law requires me to suspend
my efforts (through litigation or otherwise) to collect the debt until I mail the
requested information to you.
Sincerely,
John A. Heibl
Id.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000).
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to create a mechanism for consumers to question the validity of a
debt.2" But a debt collector must advise a consumer not only of
the consumer's right to seek verification of the debt, but also of
other matters relating to the debt.2 The collector must give the
consumer the relevant details required by the validation section
either in the initial communication or within five days thereaf-
ter.
22
At first blush, the congressional objective seems laudable
enough: make sure that the consumer knows what the debt is
about and inform him of his rights to challenge it. The consumer
must make that challenge within thirty days after receipt of the
debt collector's notice.23 In the meantime, the collector can con-
tinue pressing the consumer for payment without affecting the
validation notice that assures the consumer that he has thirty
days to dispute the debt.24 The collector, therefore, must avoid
contradicting or overshadowing the statutory rights that the con-
sumer enjoys under the validation section.2" This is easier said
than done, for debt collectors have had problems in crafting satis-
20. The Senate Committee reflected its concern: 'This provision will eliminate the re-
curring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts
which the consumer has already paid." S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
21. The collector must inform the consumer of the amount of the debt and the name of
the creditor, and provide a statement that the collector will assume the debt to be valid
unless the consumer disputes the debt within thirty days. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(3).
22. See id. § 1692g(a).
23. See id. § 1692g(b).
24. There is no statutory restriction on the collector's ability to continue its collection
activities. See id. § 1692g. The FTC Commentary agrees that "[a] debt collector need not
cease normal collection activities within the consumer's 30-day period to give notice of a
dispute until he receives a notice from the consumer." FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at
51,109; see also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that collection
activity must stop only if the consumer disputes the debt); Sprouse v. City Credits Co., 126
F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Ditty v. CheckRite Ltd., 973 F. Supp 1320, 1329
(D. Utah 1997); FTC ANN. REP. 2001: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 11 (2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/fdcpaar2000.pdf (last modified March 23, 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 FTC ANN. REP.].
25. The Second Circuit gave some guidance in Russell v. Equifax A.R.S. about when a
collector's notice is contradictory or overshadowing:
A notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it would make the least sophis-
ticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. It is not enough for a debt collec-
tion agency simply to include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to
a consumer-Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.
74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir.
1991); Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson
v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988).
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factory collection language that does not detract from the valida-
tion message."
B. The Problem of Contradiction
Congress thought it important for consumers to be able to dis-
pute debts." A debt collector should not have any problem com-
municating that right to a consumer. The difficulty arises when
the debt collector wants to impress the consumer with its collec-
tion language while explaining the thirty-day dispute period to
the customer.28
26. Most courts view a collector's conduct through the eyes of the least sophisticated
consumer to determine whether the collector has violated § 1692g. See Smith v. Computer
Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428,
1431-32 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir.
1996); Russell, 74 F.3d at 36. "[T]he test is how the least sophisticated consumer-one not
having the astuteness of a 'Philadelphia lawyer' or even the sophistication of the average,
everyday, common consumer-understands the notice he or she receives." Russell, 74 F.3d
at 34. It has also been said that the least sophisticated consumer standard is "lower than
simply examining whether particular language would deceive or mislead a reasonable
debtor." Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1227. The Second Circuit explained the standard a little
more in applying it to a violation of § 1692e: "[I]t (1) ensures the protection of all consum-
ers, even the naive and the trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices, and (2)
protects debt collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of col-
lection notices." Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993).
In Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh
Circuit was uncomfortable with the least sophisticated consumer standard and opted in-
stead for the "simpler and less confusing formulation of a standard designed to protect
those consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence." Id. at 1257. The court
came up with the term "unsophisticated" because the unsophisticated consumer was not
on the last rung of the sophistication ladder like the least sophisticated consumer. Id.
Thus under the unsophisticated consumer standard, the court could protect the consumer
who is naive or uninformed, while maintaining an element of reasonableness. Id. A little
later, the Seventh Circuit admitted in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996), that
"the unsophisticated consumer standard is a distinction without much of a practical dif-
ference in application." Id. at 227.
27. A House Committee reported: "[I]n many cases people who do not even owe a debt
in the first place are being harassed by debt collectors virtually without recourse." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1202, at 5 (1976). Another report reflected the same sentiment: "This bill also
protects people who do not owe money at all. In the collector's zeal, collection efforts are
often aimed at the wrong person either because of mistaken identity or mistaken facts."
H.R. REP. No. 95-131, at 8 (1977).
28. The FDCPA does not prevent the debt collector from continuing its collection ef-
forts during the thirty-day period granted to the consumer for disputing the debt. See su-
pra note 24 and accompanying text. The FTC supported this interpretation in its first ad-
visory opinion on the FDCPA in response to a request from the American Collectors
Association, stating "The Commission continues to believe that the thirty-day time frame
set forth in Section 809 [15 U.S.C. § 1692g] is a dispute period within which the consumer
may insist that the collector verify the debt, and not a grace period within which collection
20031
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Perhaps Congress expected too much from debt collectors. A
collector usually approaches its assignments with determina-
tion.29 This exuberance drives the collector to demand payment
immediately or within a certain number of days, while simulta-
neously conceding the consumers's right to challenge the debt
within thirty days.30 The statute puts the collector in this quan-
dary by allowing the collector to continue its collection activities
unless the consumer requests verification of the debt.3 The col-
lector, therefore, has the unenviable task of conveying its collec-
tion message, while not contradicting or overshadowing the con-
sumer's statutory rights.32
efforts are prohibited." Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission, to Basil J. Mezines, Esq., Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, L.L.P. (Mar. 31, 2000) (re-
sponse to a request for advisory opinions on the FDCPA), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/fdcpaadvisoryopinion.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). The
FDCPA protects a collector that acts in conformity with an FTC advisory opinion. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2000). On the other hand, informal staff letters and the FTC Commen-
tary are not binding on the FTC, the public, or the courts. See FTC Commentary, supra
note 11, at 50,101; see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995).
29. At the congressional hearings on the FDCPA, one witness provided some insight
into the collections industry. He testified: "The business of debt collection agencies is to
make money. By being nice, you don't get anywhere. You must be hard, harsh-not to the
point of breaking the law, but you cannot be a nice guy and bring in the money." Hearings,
supra note 3, at 62 (testimony of Hugh Wilson, San Francisco, Cal.).
30. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
the collector asked for immediate payment); Avila, 84 F.3d at 226 (stating that the collec-
tor demanded payment in ten days); Graziano, 950 F.2d at 109 (noting that the collector
demanded payment within ten days); Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225 (noting that the collector
threatened the consumer's credit reputation if payment was not made in ten days);
Rhoades v. W. Va. Credit Bureau Reporting Servs., 96 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. W. Va.
2000) (noting that the collector demanded immediate payment).
31. Once the consumer lodges his dispute, the collector must "cease collection of the
debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the
debt or a copy of a judgment." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
32. The collector may find that similar collection language brings different judicial
responses. For example, in Savino, the language read: "'The hospital insists on immediate
payment or a valid reason for your failure to make payment." 164 F.3d at 85 (emphasis
omitted). The court found that the collector's violation of the Act "consisted of its decision
to ask for immediate payment without also explaining that its demand did not override
the consumer's rights under Section 1692g to seek validation of the debt." Id. at 86. Never-
theless, the court in Powell v. Computer Credit, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Ohio 1997),
affd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26797 (6th Cir. 1998), faced the same language and reached a
different conclusion. The court saw no problem of overshadowing because it treated the
language as providing "two alternatives" to the consumer. Id. at 1043. The consumer could
make immediate payment, but if he had a valid reason, he did not have to do so. Id. What
is a collector to make of this? This is the kind of challenge that a collector faces in trying to
blend the validation notice with its own collection message.
[Vol. 37:511
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Debt collectors have used different formulations to achieve
their objective. In Graziano v. Harrison,33 the collector threatened
legal action unless the consumer paid within ten days.34 The
Third Circuit viewed the collection language as a contradictory
demand that prevented the collector from effectively communicat-
ing notice about the consumer's rights.3" The collector's threat of
legal action may have tipped the scales in the consumer's favor,
but, even in the absence of such a threat, the consumer could
have been induced into overlooking the thirty-day period for dis-
puting the debt.36 The conflict between the time for payment and
the time for lodging a notice of dispute sows the seed of confusion
in a consumer's mind.37 If the consumer decides to take the entire
thirty-day period to think about disputing the debt, he will ques-
tion whether he enjoys that luxury if the collection letter stipu-
lates a shorter time for payment. This contradiction induces the
kind of confusion that causes problems for a consumer. Even if
the time for payment coincides with the time for disputing the
debt, there is still room for confusion if the debt collector does not
explain how the two time periods relate to each other.8
33. 950 F.2d at 107.
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 111.
36. Id. The collector in Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) had the same problem. Its message read as follows: "IF THIS
ACCOUNT IS PAID WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS IT WILL NOT BE RECORDED IN
OUR MASTER FILE AS AN UNPAID COLLECTION ITEM. A GOOD CREDIT
RATING-IS YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET." Id. at 1225. The court viewed the lan-
guage as an attempt to mislead the consumer into overlooking the validation notice. Id. at
1226. The form invoked a response period that was shorter than the statutory dispute pe-
riod of thirty days, "promising harm to the debtor who waitfed] beyond 10 days." Id.
37. In Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit explained
the dilemma:
The cases that find the statute violated generally involve neither logical in-
consistencies (that is, denials of the consumer rights that the dunning letter
is required to disclose) nor the kind of literal "overshadowing" involved in a
fine-print, or faint-print, or confusing-typeface case. In the typical case, the
letter both demands payment within thirty days and explains the consumer's
right to demand verification within thirty days. These rights are not inconsis-
tent, but by failing to explain how they fit together the letter confuses.
Id. at 500.
38. Confusion may come in more than one form. "A contradiction is just one means of
inducing confusion; 'overshadowing' is just another; and the most common is a third, the
failure to explain an apparent though not actual contradiction.. . ." Bartlett, 128 F.3d at
500.
20031
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The debt collector used different language in Wilson v. Quad-
rained Corp., 39 and the Third Circuit had a different reaction."
Instead of demanding payment within a specific time, the debt
collector advised the consumer in the first paragraph of the col-
lection letter: "We shall afford you the opportunity to pay this bill
immediately and avoid further action against you."4' The court
did not interpret the invitation to pay immediately as a demand
for payment in less than thirty days. 2 The court viewed the lan-
guage as merely expressing the collector's interest in receiving ei-
ther the consumer's timely payment or notice of dispute. 3 The
collection letter did not elevate one option over the other, but
merely left the choice to the consumer.4
The Wilson court did not see a demand for payment that con-
tradicted the consumer's right to query the debt.45 This was sur-
prising because many courts have searched for language of de-
mand or of insistence that counteracts the consumer's statutory
option.46 The softer language in Wilson still mentioned a possible
sanction if the consumer did not make immediate payment.47 It
did not explain the further action that could ensue from a failure
to pay, but it was sufficient to make the consumer think that he
might be not be able to wait out the thirty-day period before con-
39. 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000).
40. See id. at 351-52.
41. Id. at 352.
42. See id. at 356.
43. See id. at 360. The court rejected the argument that "the statement 'affording him
an opportunity to pay immediately and avoid further action' is the equivalent of demand-
ing payment within a period of less than thirty days." Id. at 356.
44. See id. at 360-61.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller v.
Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); Rabideau v. Mgmt. Adjustment
Bureau, 805 F. Supp. 1086 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
47. 225 F.3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 2000). The consumer could "avoid further action" by
paying immediately. Id. The court seemed content that this gave the consumer the option
of either paying immediately, or disputing the debt pursuant to the statutory validation
notice mentioned later in the collection letter. Id. at 360. Yet in Adams v. Law Offices of
Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the collector's warning to the con-
sumer to pay immediately in order "to avoid trouble" violated the statute. Id. at 527. As-
suming the consumer's favorable response to the collector would avoid further action or
would avoid trouble,, the message to the consumer was the same. The consumer had to
take prompt action if he wanted to avoid the problems which might ensue from his failure
to pay. The court in Wilson seemed convinced that a consumer would not interpret a de-
mand for immediate payment as a demand for payment in less than thirty days. 225 F.3d
at 356. The court must have had some notion, therefore, that payment in more than thirty
days constituted immediate payment.
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testing the debt. The consumer could have avoided further action
in Wilson by paying "immediately"4" and legal action in Graziano
by paying "within ten days."49 The consumer would likely have
been confused about his rights in both cases, yet the Wilson court
interpreted the language as merely giving the consumer a choice
of either paying or questioning the debt."
In Veillard v. Mednick,"1 the collection letter declared the debt
to be "due immediately," 2 and the court found this language to be
the same as requiring the consumer to make immediate pay-
ment.53 This was enough to create confusion in the consumer's
mind about what might happen if the consumer disputed the va-
lidity of the debt. 4 There was no explicit demand for immediate
payment in the collection notice, but the collector conveyed the
message that the consumer's best interests would be served by
resolving the matter as soon as possible.55 The attraction in Veil-
lard was that there was no specific number of days stipulated for
payment that offered a clear contradiction of the thirty-day statu-
48. 225 F.3d at 352.
49. 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
50. 225 F.3d at 360-61. It is understandable that a consumer would be able to relate
more readily to the difference between a ten-day payment period and a thirty-day dispute
period. The least sophisticated consumer might be persuaded that he had a deadline of ten
days to act. The Wilson court read Graziano in this light. See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 356. The
Wilson court must also have been impressed by the absence of a specific Graziano-type
threat of immediate legal action. See id. It found comfort in Burns v. Accelerated Bureau of
Collections of Virginia, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1993), where the collector ad-
vised the consumer that it took the account for immediate collection, that time was of the
essence, and that payment should be made "today." Id. at 476. The Burns court inter-
preted that language as merely sending a message that the collector wanted to collect the
debt in a timely manner, without creating a conflict with the thirty-day dispute period. See
id. at 477. One wonders how important it was that both the collection message and the
validation notice appeared on the same page without screaming headlines and an express
threat.
51. 24 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
52. Id. at 865. The collection language read: "Your best interest will be served by re-
solving this matter as soon as possible as our client shows this obligation to be due imme-
diately." Id.
53. See id. at 869. In Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the
collector asked the consumer to "immediately make payment to or arrangements with
[Jerry Montell Pontiac]." Id. at 1132. In Ozkaya v. Telecheck Services, Inc., 982 F. Supp.
578 (N.D. fI1. 1997), the court found that the collection letter overshadowed the validation
notice because of confusion produced by the demand to resolve the dispute "quickly." Id. at
583-84.
54. See Veillard, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
55. Id. at 865. The court saw no distinction between a collector's demand to "make
payment immediately" and the admonition that the obligation was "due immediately." Id.
at 869.
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tory period for disputing the debt.5" Nevertheless, the overriding
consideration was the confusion engendered in the consumer's
mind by the urgency of the date for payment.17 The debt collec-
tor's strategy in these collection cases is to leave the impression
that the consumer should pay the debt to avoid problems later.5"
The confused consumer may relent in the face of seemingly over-
whelming odds. When that happens, the debt collector has ac-
complished its objective.
Sometimes a debt collector will insist on immediate action by a
consumer that does not equate to an outright demand for pay-
ment. In Terran v. Kaplan,59 the debt collector invited the con-
sumer to call him immediately or he would recommend legal ac-
tion to his client.60 The court saw no contradiction between the
call for the consumer to communicate with the debt collector and
56. The collector urged payment "as soon as possible" because its client showed the
obligation to be "due immediately," Id. at 865. Cf. United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., 98
F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996) (demanding immediate payment or payment within ten
days); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1996) (demanding payment in ten
days); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1991) (threatening action if pay-
ment not made in ten days).
57. See Veillard, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 868. The court in Bartlett v. Heibl recognized that
the "unsophisticated consumer is to be protected against confusion whatever form it
takes." 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997).
58. In Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., the collector asked for immediate payment or a
valid reason for [the consumer's] failure to make payment." 164 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
The problem here was that the collector demanded immediate payment without explaining
to the consumer that its demand did not override the consumer's validation rights under
the FDCPA. Id. at 86. The court suggested some reconciliation language:
Although we have requested that you make immediate payment or provide a
valid reason for nonpayment, you still have the right to make a written re-
quest, within thirty days of your receipt of this notice, for more information
about the debt. Your rights are described on the reverse side of this notice.
Our demand for immediate payment does not eliminate your right to dispute
this debt within thirty days of receipt of this notice. If you choose to do so, we
are required by law to cease our collection efforts until we have mailed that
information to you. Your rights are described on the reverse side of this no-
tice.
Id.
The admonition to avoid later problems comes in many forms. See Swanson v. S. Or.
Credit Serv., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the collector threatened to
damage consumer's credit in ten days); DeSantis v. Roz-Ber, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that the collector threatened that if consumer did not pay in full or
call to arrange settlement, the collector would not cooperate with consumer); Morgan v.
Credit Adjustment Bd., 999 F. Supp. 803, 807 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("To stop further action, pay
your account in full to this office.").
59. 109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 1430.
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the thirty-day validation notice.61 The collector had a strategy to
confuse the consumer: he wanted action on his collection letter.
The sanction for the consumer's failure to make contact was that
the collector would encourage the creditor to sue the consumer.62
Surely the collector did not expect the consumer to call merely for
social conversation. If the collection letter had simply invited the
consumer to discuss the outstanding debt, the consumer would
not have had a reasonable basis for confusion about the accompa-
nying validation notice. Terran offered an appealing variation,
since the collector did not demand payment within a specific time
that conflicted with the thirty-day validation period.63 The collec-
tor met the challenge by staying away from a forthright demand,
but the collector hoped, nevertheless, that this different formula-
tion would leave the consumer in a quandary about the situa-
tion.64
61. Id. at 1434. The court explained as follows:
The request that the debtor telephone the collection agency does not contra-
dict the admonition that the debtor has thirty days to contest the validity of
the debt. This language simply encourages the debtor to communicate with
the debt collection agency. It does not threaten or encourage the least sophis-
ticated debtor to waive his statutory right to challenge the validity of the
debt.
Id.
62. Id. at 1430. The court found it significant that the collector did not demand pay-
ment immediately. Id. at 1434. That would have created a conflict between such a demand
and the consumer's right to challenge the debt within thirty days. See id. Some courts look
to see whether the collector has threatened the consumer's right to dispute the validity of
the debt. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting conflicting time periods in the demand for payment and the validation notice);
Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting a threat to the consumer's
credit record if payment was not made within ten days). If there is no threat to the con-
sumer's right to dispute the debt, it is easier for a court to find that no statutory violation
exists. In Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1999), the collector
promised to advise the consumer of its "final position regarding the status of [the] ac-
count,".if the consumer did not pay before the validation period expired. Id. at 1053. The
court saw no problem with that language because there was no threat to institute legal
action and there was no reference to the consumer's credit being damaged if the consumer
did not pay by a certain time. Id. at 1055. However, when the collector threatens the con-
sumer with the "trouble of litigation" if the consumer does not pay "now," this kind of lan-
guage dilutes the effect of the validation notice. Baker v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 13
F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1042 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
63. See 109 F.3d at 1434.
64. A collector will rely on the difference between an "immediate telephone call" and
"immediate payment." See id. at 1434. A telephone call may not lead to immediate pay-
ment of the debt, and, therefore, the consumer's statutory right to dispute the debt will not
be compromised in any way. See id. Nevertheless, a collector will still be able to exercise
some leverage with the mere promise of "legal action" in the absence of the consumer's re-
sponse. See id. A collector may even suggest to the consumer that he should pay or contact
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The statute challenges the debt collector to inform the con-
sumer about the verification procedure and to fashion language
that will gently remind the consumer of his obligation to pay.65
When the collector goes beyond the permissible limits of reconcil-
ing the demand for payment with the consumer's validation
rights, he creates either an apparent or actual conflict.66 In Ter-
ran, the alternative to the consumer's failure to communicate
with the debt collector was the debt collector's resort to legal ac-
tion.67
The option in Vasquez v. Gertler & Gertler, Ltd.6" was less omi-
nous. The debt collector asked that the consumer show his coop-
eration by either sending his payment or contacting the debt col-
lector without delay.69 The collector did not make any demand of
the consumer that was inconsistent with the consumer's verifica-
tion rights.7" The collector could not have been gentler in its ap-
proach-even using the word "kindly" to invite the consumer's at-
tention and cooperation.7'
the collector without further delay. The collector's magical language in Vasquez v. Gertler
& Gertler, Ltd. 987 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill. 1997), avoided a violation. Id. at 655. It urged:
"Kindly let me have your immediate attention and cooperation by sending me your pay-
ment or contacting me without further delay." Id. Thus, even though the message called
for payment, the consumer had an option to contact the collector instead. Id. at 657.
65. There was an example of such language in Young v. Meyer & Njus, P.A., 953 F.
Supp. 238 (N.D. Ill. 1997), where the letter read: "We... have been retained by RNB to
commence legal action against you to collect the balance due on the accounts reference
above." Id. at 240. The letter then concluded: "[Rlemittance in full to us by return mail will
close our file." Id. The court saw no contradiction or overshadowing because the reference
to "legal action" merely explained the collector's role and the request for payment by "re-
turn mail" merely asked for payment to be sent by mail without any time period being set.
Id. There was nothing offensive in the collector's communication. See id. The letter did not
warn of adverse consequences if the consumer refused to pay within a period shorter than
the statutory validation period of thirty days. Id.; cf Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th
Cir. 1996); Russell, 74 F.3d at 34; Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484
(4th Cir. 1991).
66. As the court in Bartlett v. Heibl pointed out, the most common problem is a collec-
tor's failure to explain an apparent contradiction. See 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997).
The court pointed out:
On the one hand, Heibl's letter tells the debtor that if he doesn't pay within a
week he's going to be sued. On the other hand, it tells him that he can contest
the debt within thirty days. This leaves up in the air what happens if he is
sued on the eighth day, say, and disputes the debt on the tenth day.
Id. at 501.
67. 109 F.3d at 1430.
68. 987 F. Supp. at 652.
69. Id. at 655.
70. Id. at 658.
71. Id. at 655. The collector's polite approach may have reflected a strategy to disarm
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There is nothing objectionable in principle to the encourage-
ment of dialogue between the collector and the consumer. Never-
theless, there is a fine line between dialogue and demand, and
many collectors find it difficult to maintain the difference. When
there is no precise period set for payment, however, it is more dif-
ficult for a consumer to prove that the collector has infringed the
consumer's rights of validation.12 The theory is that a consumer is
less likely to be confused unless there is a conflict between the
applicable time periods.
C. Overshadowing Language
Collectors not only run into trouble by using contradictory lan-
guage, but also by overshadowing the validation notice with their
own claims. In many cases, a collector puts the validation notice
on the back of its collection letter, while demanding payment
from the consumer on the front of the letter in large print.73 Al-
though the FDCPA does not prescribe any particular format or
type size for the validation notice,74 courts have been adept at
recognizing the collector's objective in placing the notice in a for-
mat that does not invite the consumer's attention.75 One of the
the consumer, thus encouraging a false sense of security. The language was admirable:
"Kindly let me have your immediate attention and cooperation by sending me your pay-
ment or contacting me without further delay." Id. The court viewed this as simply provid-
ing the consumer with an option: paying the collector or contacting the collector (neither of
which imposed a time limit). Id. at 658.
72. See Wilson v. Quadramed, 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000); Terran, 109 F.3d at 1428;
Burns v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections of Va., 828 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996);
Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988); Rhoades v. W. Va. Credit
Bureau Reporting Servs., 96 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. W. Va. 2000); Macarz v. Transworld
Sys., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 1998); Rabideau v. Mgmt. Adjustment Bureau, 805
F. Supp. 1086 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
74. The FTC commented on the problem in its 2001 annual report:
As presently drafted, the FDCPA does not specify any standard for how the
809(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)] notice must be presented to consumers, such as
the color and size of the typeface and the location on the collection notice. At-
tempting to take advantage of this lack of clarity, some debt collectors print
the notice in a type size considerably smaller than the other language in the
dunning letter, or obscure the notice by printing it on a non-contrasting
background in a non-contrasting color.
2001 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 24, at 10.
75. See Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that "screaming headlines, bright colors and huge lettering" overshadowed the valida-
tion notice); Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225-26 (noting that the validation notice was over-
shadowed by "a bold faced, underlined message three times the size which dominate[d] the
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worst mistakes that a collector can make is failing to refer on the
front page to the important validation notice that appears on the
back of the collection letter.76 Similarly, when the collection letter
directs the consumer's attention to the reverse side of the letter
with contrasting small type, the notice may elude the consumer. 77
The overriding consideration in these contradiction and over-
shadowing cases is that the collector must convey the validation
notice effectively.7 It is not sufficient for the collector to repro-
duce the statutory language without any thought of its impact on
the consumer.79 From a collector's perspective, however, it is de-
sirable for the consumer to overlook the validation notice. There-
fore, even if there is no actual or apparent contradiction in the
collection material, the collector frequently uses some diversion-
ary tactic to steer the consumer away from his right to challenge
the debt.
The collector took a novel approach in Martinez v. Law Offices
of David J. Stern, P.A.8 ° The collector brought suit against the
consumer with a sixteen-page document that began with the
summons and complaint and ended with the note and mortgage."
The first page of the document warned the consumer that he
might lose his wages, money, and property if he did not respond
to the summons on time.82 The validation notice did not appear
until the eighth page. The strategy was to emphasize the first-
page threat while obscuring the notice by placing it later in the
document.8 4 The collector must have thought itself on safe ground
center of the page"); Macarz, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (noting that the validation notice was
overshadowed when "relegated to the very bottom of the page in a difficult to read and
nondistinctive print, where it appear[ed] to look purposefully insignificant").
76. See Riviera v. MAB Collections, 682 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Ost v. Collec-
tion Bureau, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 701 (D.N.D. 1980).
77. See Rabideau, 805 F. Supp. at 1093.
78. See Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000); Johnson v.
Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996); Miller, 943 F.2d at 483; Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1224.
79. See Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1997); Macarz,
26 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
80. 266 B.R. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
81. See id. at 530.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. The court identified the problem:
[Tihe ominous sentence, "IF YOU DO NOT FILE YOUR RESPONSE ON
TIME, YOU MAY LOSE THE CASE, AND YOUR WAGES, MONEY AND
PROPERTY MAY THEREAFTER BE TAKEN WITHOUT FURTHER
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because it gave the consumer thirty days to answer the summons
and the same period to seek verification of the debt. 5 There was
no actual conflict here, but the collector faced the same hurdle
that plagues collectors generally-the reconciliation challenge.8 6
It was not enough to include the statutory language in the collec-
tion materials.8 7 The collector should have conveyed its message
effectively by relating its claim for payment to the consumer's
validation rights.88 When the collector uses a summons as its ini-
tial communication, it can exert even greater pressure on the con-
sumer.8 9 At this stage the collector has gone beyond the threat to
sue.9 ° Once the suit begins, the consumer may feel that his only
option is to respond to the complaint.91 He may be encouraged in
this view because the collector does not have to give any notice
that a consumer's objection will require the collector to suspend
collection activities.92 If the consumer is unaware of the effect of
WARNING FROM THE COURT" on the first page of the Initial Communica-
tion would cause a least sophisticated consumer to heed the warning and
choose to answer the complaint. This threatened consequence set out in bold
language leads the court to the inescapable conclusion that a least sophisti-
cated consumer would not fully understand or appreciate the FDCPA Notice.
Id. at 534.
85. Id. at 535.
86. "[I]f two or more messages would deliver mixed guidance to a least sophisticated
consumer as to his rights under the FDCPA, reconciling language ought to be utilized to
provide effective notice." Id. at 536; see also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th
Cir. 1997).
87. Martinez, 266 B.R. at 536.
88. Id.
89. It has been recognized that it is better to send the validation notice separately
from the summons in order to avoid confusion. See NATL CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION § 5.7.2.1.3 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2001) [hereinafter NCLC]. There is no prob-
lem with this approach because the collector may give the consumer the notice either be-
fore serving the summons, or if the summons is the first communication, within five days
thereafter. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). A summons can be a first communication be-
cause the FDCPA covers attorneys who regularly engage in debt collection activity, even
when the activity consists of litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). So
when such an attorney serves a summons or similar document on the consumer, that
document is a communication under the FDCPA. See id. at 298-99.
90. In Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991), the collector threatened to
take legal action unless the debt was resolved. Id at 111. In Martinez, the collector actu-
ally commenced suit. 266 B.R. at 530. It seems, therefore, that the consumer would be un-
der greater pressure in those circumstances. See Martinez, 266 B.R. at 534.
91. In Martinez, the defendant's counsel was at a loss to explain to the court what "the
effect would have been on the time frame to file a responsive pleading to the complaint if
the Debtor had requested validation of the debt pursuant to the FDCPA notice." 266 B.R.
at 534. This was evidence of confusion created by the collector's initial communication. Id.;
see also Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Subsection (a) contains the information that the collector
must give to the consumer, including the consumer's right to dispute the debt, but the ob-
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his disputing the debt, he may not be motivated to assert his
rights, and the collector will benefit from the consumer's igno-
rance.
A collector has an even greater opportunity to confuse a con-
sumer in a Martinez-type case when the validation notice is com-
bined with the collection demand. The collector can confront the
consumer with threatening language on the first page of the
summons and place the validation language much later in the
document, so that there is a good possibility that the consumer
may never get to that material. 3 He may be so overcome with the
original shock about what can happen if he does not pay that he
may not be particularly excited about the chance to dispute the
debt. 4 The validation notice is overpowered by the collector's
threatening language on the summons, and the consumer has a
greater chance of overlooking the information about his verifica-
tion rights.95 Furthermore, the collector increases pressure on the
consumer once it initiates its suit. The consumer may wonder
about the utility of querying the debt when the documentation
requires him to file a legal response to the collector's claim.96
ligation to cease collection efforts is deferred to subsection (b) without including any re-
quirement for the collector to notify the consumer about the effect of the consumer's dis-
pute. See id. § 1692g(a).
93. It is the dire consequences suggested on the first page of the document that would
move the least sophisticated consumer to heed the warning and respond to the summons
and complaint. See Martinez, 266 B.R. at 534.
94. It has been said the "[tihe summons and the FDCPA validation rights notice are
two wholly separate dispute resolution systems. Separate notices avoid confusing the con-
sumer." NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.3. The consumer's notice of dispute should stop the
collector's lawsuit, at least until the collector has provided the necessary information
about the debt. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fink, No. 93-C4941, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16821, at
*11-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1994).
95. It all relates to a matter of confusion. In Martinez, the defendant's counsel had an
answer to the court's question about what a least sophisticated consumer should have
done since the collector's communication required an answer to the complaint within
thirty days, but also gave the consumer thirty days to dispute the debt. See 266 B.R. at
535. The learned counsel advised the court that the consumer could both respond to the
complaint and dispute the debt. Id. It was not surprising that the court viewed counsel's
answer as an admission that the communication was confusing. See id. The consumer
would respond to the complaint while disputing the debt only if he was uncertain about
his rights. See id.; see also Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500 ("It would be better if the courts just
said that the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected against confusion whatever form
its takes.").
96. If there is great pressure on the consumer when the collector merely threatens
legal action, one can imagine what it is like for the consumer when he is dealing with an
actual lawsuit. "[Liogic suggests that a least sophisticated consumer would be more com-
pelled to obey the fulfillment of a threat than the threat itself." Martinez, 266 B.R. at 534.
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Overshadowing can come in different forms. The whole idea is
to make a consumer uncertain about his rights." The collector
achieved that result in Greer v. Shapiro & Kreisman" when it in-
cluded the usual statutory language, but also warned that "[I]egal
proceedings [had] been instituted or [would] be instituted as soon
as possible notwithstanding this Notice."99 It would be natural for
a consumer to wonder whether he should even bother to raise
questions about the debt if the collector had already initiated, or
was about to initiate, litigation."' Unlike the consumer in Wil-
son,"'0 the consumer in Greer did not have any options because le-
gal proceedings were in process or imminent.1 2 The collector had
carefully drafted its letter so that the reference in the first para-
graph to legal proceedings was calculated to catch the consumer's
eye."0 3 The pressure was immediate, since the consumer wanted
to do something to stop the legal proceedings.
The collector always wants the consumer to believe that there
is no option other than payment. The collector can accomplish
that objective by insisting that the consumer pay immediately in
order to avoid trouble.10 4 The consumer must then deal with that
threat. When the consumer confronts the troublesome demand
first, he is usually in no condition to relate that to a subsequent
validation notice. This missing link between the demand and the
notice serves the collector well, for the consumer feels that the
97. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Miller
v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); Rabideau v. Mgmt. Adjust-
ment Bureau, 805 F. Supp. 1086 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
98. 152 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
99. Id. at 681.
100. See id. at 684.
101. In Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit
viewed the consumer as having two options, neither of which overshadowed the other. Id.
at 356. The consumer could either pay the debt and avoid further action, or dispute the
debt within thirty days. See id. There was no language encouraging the consumer to pay
immediately rather than dispute the debt. See id.
102. See Greer, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
103. See id. As the court rightly pointed out, "[t]he juxtaposition of Plaintiffs statutory
rights with an indication that legal proceedings had been instituted (or will be instituted
as soon as possible) would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her
rights." Id. at 685. It was this uncertainty that motivated the court in Bartlett v. Heibl to
provide some guidance to collectors in reconciling the consumer's validation rights with
the collector's urge to continue its collection activities. See 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.
1997).
104. See Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1999); Savino v.
Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc.,
943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991).
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demand for payment has an urgency to it that cannot be diluted
by any later language. °5
In Miller v. Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 10 6 the collec-
tor made its demand for immediate payment on the front in large
white letters set off against a red background, as contrasted with
the ordinary validation notice on the back.10 7 The collection letter
also demanded immediate action from the consumer." 8 That de-
mand and the placement on the validation notice made for an of-
fensive combination that was calculated to mislead the consumer
into overlooking the notice.10 9
In Young v. Meyer & Njus, P.A., 0 the collection letter invited
payment by return mail so that the collector could close out the
file."' The collector's demands and the validation notice appeared
together on the same page and in the same typeface.'12 The court
found this approach acceptable because the collector's reference to
legal action and payment by return mail did not leave the im-
pression that the consumer had to pay immediately to avoid prob-
lems later on."' Furthermore, the request for payment was not
isolated in oversized capital letters that would induce the con-
sumer to overlook the statutory validation notice."' The collection
letter passed scrutiny this time only because there were no objec-
tionable features that distracted the consumer's attention from
105. See generally Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 497; Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d
Cir. 1996); Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Adams v. Law Of-
fices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
106. 943 F.2d at 482.
107. Id. at 483.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 484.
110. 953 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
111. Id. at 240.
112. See id.
113. Id. The court viewed the collection letter as merely explaining its purpose, inform-
ing the consumer of his validation rights, and giving instructions for payment. Id. This
was to be distinguished from other cases like Miller and Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert
& Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1996), where the demand was for immediate payment.
Miller, 943 F.2d at 484; Adams, 926 F. Supp. at 527.
114. Young, 953 F. Supp. at 240. Compare id. at 240 (using collection language and
validation notice in same type size), with Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (using collection language in bold-faced type much larger than
validation notice).
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the validation notice or that concentrated on the collector's
threats and demands.
115
A collector does not have to resort to large print or screaming
headlines to divert the consumer's attention. It can provide an in-
centive in other ways for the. consumer to neglect the validation
notice. In Harrison v. NBD Inc.,1"6 the collector made a discount
offer to the consumer which expired before the thirty-day valida-
tion period. 117 The court did not see any overshadowing here,
since the collector merely encouraged the consumer to settle the
debt for a lesser amount.11 If the consumer did not accept the set-
tlement offer, he still had thirty days to dispute the debt in the
original amount, though the discount offer would have lapsed.119
The court was not bothered by the fact that the collector's offer
expired before the thirty-day validation period. 2 ' The collector's
overture was not like a demand for immediate payment that, if
ignored, might cause trouble for the consumer. 21 There was no
indication that the collector was trying to convey the impression
that the consumer had to dispute the debt in less than thirty days
to preserve his rights.'22 Nevertheless, the effect of the collector's
offer on the consumer could only be assessed in terms of the ac-
tual discount that was on the table.
115. Young, 953 F. Supp. at 240; cf. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1996)
(threatening suit if payment not received within ten days); Miller, 943 F.2d at 484 (placing
collection language in oversized type); Rabideau v. Mgmt. Adjustment Bureau, 805 F.
Supp. 1086, 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (placing validation notice on reverse side of collection
letter).
116. 968 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
117. Id. at 848.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. Troublesome demands may take several forms. In Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen,
Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), the collection letter urged: "Please
immediately send your remittance.., or communicate with us to explain your failure to
do so." Id. at 407-08. The court found that this language left the consumer with the im-
pression that the consumers had to act immediately if they wanted to dispute the debt. Id.
at 412. Nevertheless, collection language that is calculated to encourage the consumer's
payment does not by itself overshadow a validation notice. See Anthes v. Transworld Sys.
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Del. 1991).
122. See Harrison, 968 F. Supp. at 848. The court explained that the expiration of the
discount offer before the thirty-day validation period did not provide evidence of overshad-
owing. Id. The collector can continue its collection efforts during the validation period and
such efforts can include an offer to settle for a lesser amount; but the expiration of such an
offer simply means that the original debt remains. Id.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
If the consumer faces a large debt, he may be persuaded to
forgo his statutory rights in order to avoid a contest later. It de-
pends on the relation of the discount to the alleged debt. It may
be reasonable to treat a significant discount as an offer too good
to refuse and thus, the equivalent of a demand for payment that
cannot be overlooked. 12 3 The consumer has to weigh the available
options. He can be attracted to one side or the other by the pack-
age that is being offered; however, he is usually in no position to
make a true assessment of the alternatives if one feature of the
transaction overshadows the others.'24 He may face the same
turmoil when he encounters energetic demands for immediate
payment as he does when he gets excited over a severe reduction
in the debt that will clear his name. This matters little unless the
collection language dilutes the message that the consumer still
has his validation rights. If a court perceives a collector's lan-
guage to be threatening, it is more likely to find that the language
overshadows the validation notice. In Desantis v. Roz-Ber, Inc.,
12 5
the collector urged the consumer to "remit payment in full" or to
contact the collector in order to arrange settlement. 2 6 The con-
sumer was expected to comply if he wanted the collector's "coop-
eration."'27 The collection letter demanded the consumer's imme-
diate attention.12' The court viewed this combination of terms as
an effective way of sending an implicit threat that the collector
123. If the collector is merely trying to settle the matter by offering a tempting discount
on the original debt, this should not run afoul of the FDCPA. Under this scenario, the con-
sumer can pay the lesser amount or dispute the debt. The difficulty arises when the collec-
tor creates doubt in the consumer's mind about the utility of a validation notice if the con-
sumer does not pay up immediately. See generally United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc.,
98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that collection letter conflicted with validation notice
on deadlines and overshadowed the notice with larger typeface); Borcherding-Dittloff v.
Corporate Receivables, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 822 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (finding that second let-
ter overshadowed validation notice when letter was sent only fourteen days after first let-
ter and did not say how it affected consumer's validation rights).
124. See Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that screaming headlines and large lettering in collection letter contradicted and over-
shadowed validation notice); Talbot v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846 (W.D. Va.
1999) (holding that a collector letter demanding payment in ten days to avoid certain fees
overshadowed validation notice); Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 307
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that demand for payment at once overshadowed validation no-
tice); Macarz v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding that
validation notice at bottom of page in small print was overshadowed by collection language
urging consumer to discuss any dispute).
125. 51 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
126. Id. at 248.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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would not cooperate with the consumer if the latter did not pay
immediately.129
Although the contested language in Desantis was above the
validation notice on the same page and even in the same type
size, the court was bothered by the capitalized language that in-
troduced the collector's demand for payment. 130 It called for the
consumer's "IMMEDIATE ATTENTION."13 The court believed
this language to be unnerving to the consumer. 132 Standing alone,
this phrase should have caused the court some concern with re-
spect to its overshadowing effect, but the collector took pains also
to highlight the importance of the validation notice. 3 3 Its caption
received the same prominence, for the collector introduced the no-
tice as an "IMPORTANT NOTIFICATION." 34 One wonders,
therefore, whether the court paid too much attention to the collec-
tor's device for demanding the consumer's attention.
Although the Desantis court recognized that a threat may not
be necessary for the "contested language to overshadow or con-
tradict the validation notice," it found the language to be threat-
ening.135 What was the nature of that threat? The consumer had
to pay or risk losing the collector's cooperation.'36 It seemed ques-
tionable whether the consumer knew what the collector was talk-
ing about.137 The court translated the consumer's options as pay-
ment of the debt or facing the "wrath" of the collector. 3 ' The
collector's letter demanded that the consumer either make pay-
129. Id. at 250. It is to be noted that there need be no threat for language to over-
shadow or contradict a validation notice. See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d
Cir. 1996); Beeman v. Lacy, Katzman, Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405, 411 (N.D.N.Y.
1995). But see Smith v. Fin. Collection Agencies, 770 F. Supp. 232 (D. Del. 1991).
130. 51 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 246. The court was concerned with "the threatening nature of the contested
language." Id.
135. Id. at 250.
136. Id. The collection letter read as follows:
You may not have intentionally neglected this obligation, but it is seriously
past due and demands your IMMEDIATE ATTENTION!
If you would like our cooperation then:
1. Remit payment in full to this office or,
2. Contact the undersigned in person or by telephone and arrange settlement.
Id. at 248.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 251.
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ment in full or contact the collector to arrange settlement 139 It
was this aspect of the letter that distinguished Desantis from Ter-
ran, where the collector asked the consumer to telephone its col-
lection assistant immediately.14 ° In Desantis, the consumer's call
was supposed to arrange settlement terms."' It was a channel for
immediate payment.4 The decision about overshadowing should
have rested, therefore, on the conflict between the collector's de-
mand for such payment and the consumer's rights under the vali-
dation notice. 43
D. The Subsequent Notice
Even when a collector follows the rules in its initial validation
notice, it can nevertheless cause confusion with a subsequent col-
lection notice. The collector may dutifully advise the consumer
about the thirty-day period for disputing the debt and then send
another notice during that period urging the consumer to pay.
That second letter may overshadow the validation notice when it
warns the consumer that failure to respond to the first letter may
compel the collector to seek further remedies. In such a situation,
the second letter sent within the original thirty-day period may
have the effect of diluting the consumer's statutory rights so care-
fully delineated in the first letter and the consumer is left unsure
of his options. 44
In Monokrousos v. Computer Credit, Inc.,'45 the collector pro-
vided the usual validation notice in its first collection letter. 6' In
139. See id. at 248.
140. Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997). The relevant language in
Terran read as follows: "Unless an immediate telephone call is made to J SCOTT, a collec-
tion assistant of our office... , we .may find it necessary to recommend to our client that
they proceed with legal action." Id. The court could find no way to tie the call for telephone
contact to a demand for immediate payment. Id. at 1434.
141. 51 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
142. See id.
143. Perhaps the court was influenced by the collector's threat of not giving cooperation
to the consumer if the consumer failed to make contact. The question is whether a con-
sumer would be affected by this pledge of non-cooperation. The court obviously thought so.
See id. at 251. The court found the options in Desantis more onerous than those in Terran.
Id.; see also NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.3 n.984.
144. See, e.g., Borcherding-Dittloff v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 822,
823 (W.D. Wis. 1999); Booth v. Collection Experts, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1997).
145. 984 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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a subsequent letter, the collector advised the consumer that if the
consumer did not pay before the thirty-day period expired, the
collector would inform the consumer of its final position on the
account. 147 What the collector gave with one hand it took away
with the other. The collector obviously wanted to shake up the
consumer' and grew impatient despite the original promise that
the consumer had thirty days to dispute the debt.'
48
It is not unusual for a collector to take this approach, confident
that strict adherence in the first letter to the statutory require-
ment of giving the proper validation notice would not be affected
by a subsequent attempt to impress the consumer with the ur-
gency of the matter. The collector attempted such a strategy in
Trull v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership,49 when it sent a second
letter to the consumer.15 ° The collector advised, even though the
original thirty-day validation period had not yet expired, that it
assumed that the debt was valid since the consumer had ignored
the collector's first notice. 5' The court held that the consumer
had stated a claim because the consumer had thirty days to dis-
pute the debt, and it was problematic for the collector to suggest a
presumption of the debt's validity when the consumer still had
time to lodge his objections. '52
The collector's objective in such cases is to put the consumer in
a quandary about the collector's plans. If the collector uses a sub-
sequent collection notice to make demands upon the consumer,
there is a good chance that the consumer will succumb to the
later communication if there is no reconciling language to explain
the collector's overtures. 53
146. Id. at 234.
147. Id.
148. See id. The collector sent three letters dated March 27, April 10, and April 24. The
April 10 letter gave the consumer fourteen days to pay, but the validation period allowed
the consumer until April 26 to do so. Id.
149. 961 F. Supp. 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
150. See id. at 1201.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1205. The collector thought that its motion to dismiss would be sus-
tained because of the language it used below the validation notice on the back of the col-
lection letter: 'The demands for payment in this letter do not reduce your rights to dispute
this debt, or any portion thereof, and/or request verification within the thirty-day period
(30) as set forth above." Id. The court framed the issue as to whether the collector's state-
ment about the assumption concerning the correctness of the debt overshadowed and con-
tradicted the validation notice. Id.
153. See generally Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (providing con-
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III. RESOLVING STATUTORY AMBIGUITY
A. Oral or Written Notice
A collector must use the validation provision to inform the con-
sumer about the salient details of the transaction and the con-
sumer's right to obtain verification of the debt.'54 If the collector
does not use the initial communication to disclose the necessary
information, it must do so in writing within five days thereaf-
ter.15 5 The statute does not require the initial communication to
be in writing;5 6 therefore, it is theoretically possible for a collec-
tor to fulfill the statutory obligation by including all the pertinent
information in the first oral communication.'57 It is not clear why
the subsequent communication must be written if the initial one
may be oral. If the ultimate objective is to ensure that the con-
sumer has an accurate record of the information relating to the
loan and also a clear understanding of his verification rights,
then it is important for the collector to inform the consumer in
writing. 5 ' A literal reading of this language suggests that the ini-
tradictory deadlines in two separate letters); Borcherding-Dittloff v. Corporate Receiv-
ables, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 822 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that the second letter "overshad-
owed" earlier disclosures contained in the first letter); Withers v. Equifax Risk Mgmt.
Servs., 40 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (using threats of placement on bad check list to
persuade consumer to pay debt); Booth v. Collection Experts, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D.
Wis. 1997) (providing conflicting information to the consumer in two separate collection
letters).
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
155. See id.
156. See id. Since the term "communication" is defined as "the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium," a communica-
tion need not be in writing. Id. § 1692a(2) (2000).
157. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,108.
158. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2. "The statute is not satisfied merely by inclu-
sion of the required debt validation notice; the notice.., must be conveyed effectively to
the debtor." Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv. 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). In Swan-
son, the court was bothered by the collection language that overshadowed and contra-
dicted the validation notice. See id. at 1225-26. At least everything was in writing and the
consumer had a chance to examine the document. See id. An initial oral communication,
however, offers the consumer no second chance for review. The congressional report offers
no clear explanation of this problem, but it identifies the validation provision as a signifi-
cant part of the legislation:
Another significant feature of this legislation is its provision requiring the
validation of debts. After initially contacting a consumer, a debt collector
must send him or her written notice stating the name of the creditor and the
amount owed....
This provision will eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning
the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has al-
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tial contact may be oral, but that a collector must follow up in
writing with the details of the debt.159 The collector has an advan-
tage in using an initial oral communication to give the consumer
the necessary information: there are no statutory guidelines to
ensure an effective communication.16 ° Unless the collector is de-
termined to satisfy itself that the consumer understands the de-
tails, some of the information is liable to fall between the cracks,
and the consumer may be even more confused than when he has
a collection letter that contains conflicting or overshadowing lan-
guage.'61 If the mission is to give the consumer a chance to avoid
invalid claims, it is critical for the consumer to have a full com-
mand of the facts. The collector should not expect a consumer to
recall all of the information covered in the validation notice if the
collector does not convey it effectively. Furthermore, allowing oral
notice creates a climate for disagreement between the collector
and the consumer about the details of the notice that the collector
gives in trying to fulfill the statutory requirements. 62 There is a
lurking ambiguity in the statutory language: the question is
whether the "information" that the collector may include in the
ready paid.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
159. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4.
160. In this connection the following observation is relevant: "[O]ral notice allows a
sharp operator to excuse its failure to provide any validation notice by later falsely assert-
ing that it had given notice orally. The result is a swearing contest with the possibility
that a sharp operator may be the more skilled witness." NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2;
see also Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, An Unholy Trilogy: Unresolved Issues Under
the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 949, 953-54 (1996).
161. If the purpose of the validation notice is to deal with mistaken claims by requiring
the collector to verify the debt, oral notice does little to facilitate matters. A collector has to
convey too much information to the consumer in the validation notice for oral notice to be
effective. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2.
162. The FTC's annual report created some doubt about the accommodation of oral no-
tice in the statutory scheme. See 2001 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 24. In discussing the
standard of clarity to be applied to the validation notice, it said:
Section 809(a) of the Act [15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000)] requires debt collectors
to send a written notice to each consumer within five days after the consumer
is first contacted, stating that if the consumer disputes the debt in writing
within thirty days after receipt of the notice, the collector will obtain and
mail verification of the debt to the consumer.
Id. at 9.
The FTC could have been more precise on the nature of the first contact. The report
suggests that the first contact should not include the validation notice, See id. The con-
gressional report was no more enlightening when it said that "[wlithin 5 days after con-
tacting a consumer, the debt collector must in writing notify the consumer of the amount
of the debt and the name of the creditor and advise the consumer of the debt collector's
duty to verify the debt if it is disputed." S. REP. No. 95-382, at 8.
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initial communication refers to "written notice" or to the details
covered in subsections (1) through (5).163 It is arguable that the
information required by § 1692g(a) is contained in those subsec-
tions only and that the manner of communicating that informa-
tion is a different matter.'64 The "information" is not the written
notice, but it is safe to say that the written notice must contain
the "information." '165 The information that the collector must con-
vey begins with the "amount of the debt" and ends with the
statement relating to the consumer's right to know the name and
address of the original creditor.166
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") agrees that the collec-
tor may provide oral notice of the validation rights in its first con-
tact with the consumer.167 The current language is a product of
several congressional amendments, none of which referred to oral
notice.168 Nevertheless, the interpretation that supports oral no-
tice results from the fact that a "communication" need not be
written'69 and the information that the statute requires the col-
163. As presently drafted, the written notice must contain the relevant "information"
only if the "initial communication" does not. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). The section does not re-
quire the initial communication to be written. See id. That is why the ambiguity persists.
See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2.
164. If the written notice must contain the statutory "information" then one would ex-
pect the initial communication to contain the same information if the collector is to be re-
lieved of the responsibility of sending out a notice within five days of that communication.
This is confirmed by the statutory language that the collector must send a written notice
with the relevant information unless "the ... information is contained in the initial com-
munication." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
165. The collector must send the consumer a written notice containing the items listed
in subsections (1) through (5). See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5).
166. See id.
167. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,108. The FTC Staff uses the Commen-
tary to publish its interpretations of the FDCPA. The Commentary is not a formal advi-
sory opinion and therefore does not bind the Commission or the public. Id. at 50,101.
168. One early bill set the stage for the current ambiguity: "Within five days after the
initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a
debt collector shall, unless such is contained in the initial communication, send the con-
sumer a written notice containing the following information." Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130 and H.R. 5294, 95th Cong.
636 (1977).
When the FDCPA was finally passed, the word "such" was replaced by "the following in-
formation." See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2. The question that must be answered is
whether Congress intended to clarify the ambiguity posed by use of the word "such," which
could have referred either to "written notice" or "the following information." Id.
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). The FDCPA gives the following definition: 'The
term 'communication' means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or in-
directly to any person through any medium." Id.
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lector to give the consumer is likewise not restricted to a written
communication, unless that communication follows within five
days of the initial contact. 7 ' It is submitted, therefore, that the
statute should be amended to require the collector to provide the
information in writing in the interest of effective communica-
tion.171 Otherwise, a consumer is at a serious disadvantage in
terms of understanding his rights concerning the collector's de-
mands.'72 Serious problems arise even when the collector's notice
is written, especially when the collector makes no attempt to ex-
plain how its demand for payment relates to the consumer's
thirty-day period for querying the debt.'73
Although a consumer must dispute the debt in writing if he
wishes the collector to verify the debt,"' a mere oral notice of dis-
pute will suffice to remove any assumption about the debt's valid-
ity."'75 One would have hoped for some consistency on this point in
the subsections, so that a consumer's oral communication would
impose an obligation on a collector to come forward with details of
the transaction.'76 Nevertheless, the consumer's oral notice of dis-
pute creates other obligations for the collector. A consumer can
hold a collector liable for failure to include the consumer's side of
the story when the collector feeds information about the debt to a
credit reporting agency. 77 In this sense, disputing the debt orally
does serve some function in the final analysis.
170. See id. § 1692g(a) (2000).
171. If Congress was concerned about reducing a collector's expense by allowing a col-
lector to include the validation notice in its initial communication, it could have required
that the notice be included in the first written communication with the consumer. This
would make it unnecessary to amend the definition of "communication." See id.
172. The verification of the debt helps the consumer to avoid invalid claims. But a con-
sumer will have a difficult time assimilating oral notice of his validation rights because of
the amount of information involved. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.7.2.1.2.
173. The FTC expressed its concern about the clarity of the validation notice. See 2001
FTC ANN. REP., supra note 24, at 10. However, that concern related to a written validation
notice when the consumer has the material before him for review. See id. If the FTC is
troubled by the different color and size of the typeface of a validation notice, it should be
even more alarmed by an oral notice that a collector can manipulate to suit the degree of
comprehension that he wants a consumer to attain.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
175. See id. § 1692g(a)(3); see also Sanchez v. Robert E. Weiss, Inc. (In re Sanchez), 173
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Ong v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., No. 98-CV-
5117(JG) 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 409, at *5-8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999); Harvey v. United
Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (D. Or. 1981).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (requiring the consumer to dispute a claim in writing).
177. See Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that col-
lector's failure to communicate that a debt is disputed violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (2000),
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However, the statute does create a scenario where a collector
can have notice that a consumer is contesting the debt, but the
collector still does not have to verify it. Thus, a collector can con-
tinue its debt collection activities fully aware of the consumer's
position, but have no obligation to delve any further into the mat-
ter.
It was this incoherency that convinced the Third Circuit in
Graziano v. Harrison7 ' that subsection (a)(3) of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g
requires the consumer to lodge his notice of dispute in writing.17 9
In reaching that conclusion, the court ignored the plain meaning
of the statute in order to bring some consistency to subsections
(a)(3)-(5)."'8 There is something to be said for such consistency,
but only congressional action can provide this remedy."8 ' Since
Congress recognized that there would be instances when consum-
ers would be unable to contest a debt in writing, it is strange in-
deed that Congress was not more flexible in allowing oral notice
when a consumer seeks verification of the debt." 2 It would be
more important for a consumer to satisfy himself about the de-
tails of the debt if he has any doubts at all, and that right would
be more meaningful if it encompassed both oral and written dis-
putes. A consumer might have a better chance of proving his case
if there is written evidence of his objections to the collector's
claim, however; that is so even with respect to subsection (a)(3) of
15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) relating to the presumption of the debt's va-
lidity. 8 3
even if the debt is disputed orally).
178. 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
179. Id. at 112.
180. See id. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning rule prevents
a court from going outside the statute to give a different interpretation. See 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed. 2000);
see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297 (1995) (reasoning that courts must follow
FDCPA's plain language).
181. There is no evidence that the difference in the subsections resulted from inadver-
tence. See Elwin Griffith, The Meaning of Language and the Element of Fairness in the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 13, 50 (1995). The oral notice of dis-
pute carries some weight in that it disputes the validity of the debt and a collector must
indicate to third parties that the debt is disputed when such parties contact the collector
about the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64,
67 (1st Cir. 1998).
182. The writing requirement appears in both subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5). See 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4)-(5) (2000).
183. See id. § 1692g(a)(3). There will always be a problem of proof when a consumer
disputes a debt orally. But that problem does not go away in subsection (a)(3) relating to
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The Graziano court should not have overlooked the plain mean-
ing of the statute in requiring written notice of the consumer's ob-
jections. Nevertheless, there is also something to be said for a
congressional review of this legislation to determine whether it is
justifiable to allow oral communication in subsection (a)(3), but to
insist on a writing in subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5).114 A consumer
should be aware that a writing is more desirable from his per-
spective; thus, he should be motivated to create a lasting record
to support his position. It may be difficult, however, for a con-
sumer to resort to a writing. 1 5 Does this mean that a consumer
must therefore forgo his right to demand more details of the con-
tested debt? If the validation section is there for the consumer's
benefit, the consumer should not be denied the section's benefit
merely because of the lack of a writing. This approach would be
consistent with the definition of "communication."" 6 The key is
for the consumer to let the collector know that he is contesting
the debt.
B. Staying with the Basics
The collector must not impose any documentary requirements
on the consumer with respect to the method of disputing the debt.
The statute merely requires the consumer to notify the collector
that the debt is in dispute, and the consumer does not have to
the validity of the debt. If the statute is consumer-friendly, then the consumer should have
a mechanism for questioning the debt without too much fanfare.
184. See id. § 1692g(a). It is amazing that Congress was remarkably clear in designat-
ing a writing requirement for subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5), but could not avoid confusion in
the introductory language of subsection (a) about the effect of an initial communication. If
the required information listed in (a)(l)-(5) can be conveyed through an initial oral com-
munication, it should not be a far stretch to allow a consumer to dispute the debt orally in
all cases covered in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
185. See Bills Pending in Congress Would Gut Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 14
NCLC REPORTS, DEBT COLLECTION AND REPOSSESSION ED. 17, 18 (1996) [hereinafter 14
NCLC REPORTS]. A 1995 House bill would have had some impact in this area by requiring
a consumer to dispute the debt in writing across the board. Id. at 18. It was observed that
H.R. 1711, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(2)-(3) (1st sess. 1995), "would especially hurt elderly con-
sumers and those with poorer literacy skills." Id.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). It is the "conveying of information regarding a debt
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." Id. It is open to question how
that information is conveyed. If written communication is preferred because of questions
of proof, a consumer should have the option of assuming a greater burden when he dis-
putes a debt orally. It is another matter to make it impossible for him to make his case
simply because there is no writing.
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provide any documents in order to.exercise his rights."8 7 Although
the collector may be inclined to volunteer the kind of documenta-
tion that a consumer may find helpful in disputing the debt, there
is a possibility that a consumer may be misled into thinking that
other documents not mentioned are unsuitable for the con-
sumer."88 In the same vein, a collector should not require a con-
sumer to indicate the nature of the dispute. 89 This exceeds the
statutory requirement for disputing the debt.
As a part of the validation notice, the collector promises that at
the request of the consumer it will obtain "verification of the debt
or a copy of a judgment;" the difficulty arises when the collector
has not obtained a judgment against the consumer but refers to
"a copy of a judgment."9 ' The collector is arguably on solid
ground in using the statutory language, but there is nothing diffi-
cult about clarifying such language to make the point that the col-
lector can only produce a copy of a judgment if the creditor has al-
ready obtained one. 191 The present statutory language leaves the
consumer wondering if there is an existing judgment.192 If the
consumer believes that the collector has a judgment in hand, the
consumer may be less enthusiastic about challenging the collec-
tor. '9 It is possible for a consumer to discern a difference between
187. See Sambor v. Omnia Credit Servs., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (D. Haw.
2002); Castro v. ARS Nat'l Servs., No. 99-C4596, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2618, at *10-11
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
188. See Castro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2618, at *10-11. "The least sophisticated con-
sumer confused by [a collection letter] might choose not to notify the collection agency that
she disputes a debt's validity because she cannot or will not provide 'suitable' documenta-
tion within 30 days." Id. at *11.
189. See Frey v. Satter, Beyer & Spires, No. 99-C3957, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6912, at
*13 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1999) (ruling that consumer's allegation that collector asked him to
indicate nature of dispute adequately states claim under §1692g).
190. 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(4) (2000).
191. See Moore v. Ingram & Assoc., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.S.C. 1992) (finding that
notice about non-existent judgment is not misleading if it tracks the statutory language);
Check Cent. of Or. v. Barr (In re Barr), 54 B.R. 922, 925-26 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984); FTC
Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,105.
192. To avoid this problem some courts do not think it necessary for a collector to state
that it will provide a copy of a judgment that does not exist. See Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen,
Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y 1995); Stojanovski v. Strobl &
Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
193. The Beeman court made the point:
[W]here an exact quotation of.the language of the statute would confuse
rather than enlighten the consumer, no policy reason supports mandating
exact quotation. A plain reading of the statute as well as plain logic compel
the conclusion that a debt collector can not be required to disclose that it will
furnish a copy of a judgment which does not exist.
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the collector's promise to obtain verification of the debt or a copy
of a judgment.194 The statutory language suggests that the debt
has already been identified, but there is no certainty about the
judgment.195 The consumer cannot be sure about the message. He
cannot necessarily quarrel with the collector if the latter follows
the statutory scheme. 9 6 The collector seems to have the latitude
to inform the consumer that it will satisfy the consumer's curios-
ity in one way or another: either through verification of the debt
or by providing a copy of a judgment.'97 The fault does not there-
fore lie with a cautious collector that toes the statutory line. 9 ' It
is up to Congress to relieve collectors from the strictures of this
formula. The notice to the consumer should make the point that
the collector will obtain a copy of a judgment if one has been ob-
tained against the consumer. There is no point in leaving the
matter to pure conjecture.
C. Ceasing Collection Activities
A collector must cease its collection efforts until it is able to
satisfy a consumer's request for validation of the debt.'99 It is
noteworthy that a collector does not have to tell a consumer about
this statutory mandate. °° It seems logical that the collector's ob-
ligation to cease its collection activities should be included in sub-
section (a)(4) dealing with verification of the debt.20 ' The collec-
892 F. Supp. at 410.
194. The problem here is that the least sophisticated consumer is supposed to under-
stand the subtle difference between the debt and a judgment. By using the definite article
in relation to "debt," the draftsmen obviously meant to refer to something already identi-
fied. The same cannot be said about a judgment. Congress may have intended to give the
collector an option and may have expected the collector to do the right thing. But if the
collector has not recovered any judgment, it is questionable whether a collector must "dis-
semble and assert a falsehood in its letter." Stojanovski, 783 F. Supp. at 324.
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
196. See cases cited supra note 191. But see supra notes 172-73.
197. See cases cited supra note 191. But see supra notes 172-73.
198. The statute tells the collector that the collector must provide "a statement that...
the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the
consumer" and then mail that information to the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
200. Compare id., with id. § 1692g(a).
201. The collector's obligation to cease collection activities flows from the consumer's
intervention to dispute the debt. Subsection (a)(4) seems to be the logical place to cover the
suspension of collection efforts because the collector would have to include the matter in
the statement required by the subsection. It appears as-though Congress went out of its
way to isolate the collector's obligation to cease collection pending verification of the debt.
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tor's statement must inform the consumer that the collector will
mail a copy of the verification, but it leaves to subsection (b) the
statement of the collector's duty to suspend activities until the
collector has fulfilled its obligation under subsection (a)(4).2" 2 It
would be more useful for the consumer to know that contesting
the debt will result in an immediate freeze on the collector's ac-
tivities until the collector mails the relevant information to the
consumer."' If a consumer is aware of this interim protection, he
will have more incentive to dispute the collector's claims.
Sometimes a consumer may dispute a claim even though he is
already aware of the basis for it. The consumer's knowledge does
not affect the collector's obligation to verify the debt; the statute
does not impose any preconditions on the consumer's right to
challenge the collector.20 4 Obviously, Congress wanted to establish
some meaningful mechanism for ensuring that a collector would
not pursue the wrong consumer or try to recover incorrect
amounts.20 5 The method Congress chose would have greater im-
pact if the collector's notice to the consumer included information
concerning the collector's obligation to cease its collection efforts
until it gives the consumer the relevant information about the
debt.0 6 This does not give the consumer an unfair advantage over
a collector. A collector may be seen to have a comparable advan-
See id. § 1692g(b).
202. Compare id., with id. § 1692g(a)(4).
203. In Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Md. 1999), the con-
sumer disputed the debt in writing but the collector thereafter sent a letter offering to set-
tle the debt. Id. at 593. The court deemed this a violation of § 1692g(b) because the settle-
ment offer constituted an attempt to collect the debt. Id. If the consumer disputes the debt,
he ought to be well aware of the consequences; he need not respond to the collector until
the latter has verified the debt. A collector's settlement offer may be tempting enough to
lessen the consumer's resolve to join battle with the collector.
204. See id. at 583 (stating that the FDCPA does not create any exceptions for a verifi-
cation sent to the consumer before the consumer disputes the debt); Johnson v. Statewide
Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 100 (Wyo. 1989) (finding that the consumer's prior notice of
the debt does not affect the collector's obligation to verify debt once the consumer disputes
it).
205. With respect to the validation of debts, a Senate report gave some idea of the im-
portance of a significant feature of the legislation when it disclosed the following: "This
provision will eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person
or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid." S. REP. NO. 95-382,
at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
206. The logical question is whether Congress wanted to emphasize the collector's obli-
gation to cease collection once the consumer disputes the debt. This runs counter to the
FDCPA's underlying purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000). The "cease collection" directive
is such an intimate part of the validation process that one would have expected it to be
part of the collector's statement to the consumer required by subsection (a)(4).
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tage. A collector can theoretically try to recover a debt and, when
the consumer asks for verification, the collector can simply stop
its collection efforts instead of verifying the debt, although the
collector promises in its validation notice to obtain verification.0 7
The availability of this option serves as a sound rationale for in-
cluding the cessation mandate with the verification language in
subsection (a)(4). A consumer should be made aware of the possi-
bilities. The verification language says that the collector will ob-
tain verification of the debt, but omits the consequences of the
collector's failure to do so.20 8 The consumer should have a com-
plete picture about the verification process.
While the statute elicits the collector's promise to obtain verifi-
cation, it allows the collector to sidestep that requirement by sus-
pending collection activities."9 The collector can explain confi-
dently that it satisfies the statute by taking that approach.210 If it
is the collector's practice to return to the creditor all files that
have attracted a verification request from the consumer, the con-
sumer has no cause for complaint once the collector complies with
the statutory mandate to choose between the two available op-
tions.21" ' This scheme is very much like the collector's promise to
provide verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment. There is
something to be said for requiring a collector to do what it prom-
ised.212
The statute ought to be clarified to make the point that a col-
lector should attempt to obtain verification of the debt. If the col-
lector makes an invalid demand, then there can be no verifica-
tion, and the consumer will know where he stands. A consumer
should not be left in the lurch, not knowing whether another col-
lector will pursue him later about the same matter.2"' After all, a
207. See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assoc., 122 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith v.
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1031-32 (6th Cir. 1992).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000).
209. Jang, 122 F.3d at 484.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. It is acknowledged that a collector may not always be able to obtain verification.
But the query is whether the collector has an obligation to try under the circumstances. In
the absence of such an obligation, a collector can very well employ a strategy that dictates
the collection of unverifiable debts. If the consumer challenges the debt, the collector can
merely suspend its activities without any consequences. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(4),
1692g(b).
213. There is nothing in the statute that prevents a subsequent collector from picking
up the challenge when a consumer requests verification from a previous collector. See id.
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consumer's request for verification from one collector does not
bind any other collector.214 The original collector's abandonment
of the matter will not necessarily prevent some other collector
from taking up the creditor's cause. It is preferable, therefore, for
the consumer's challenge to have a definitive answer. The sus-
pension of the collector's pursuit will not have any effect on the
ultimate issue of the debt's validity. If there is no resolution on
that score, the consumer's query will have no impact.215
IV. A MATTER OF DEFINITION
A. The Meaning of Communication
There is another problem with the FDCPA that should concern
any consumer. The definition of the term "communication" is the
"conveying of information regarding a debt."216 The question that
arises from that definition is whether a collector has to mention
the debt specifically in order for its contact to be called a "com-
munication." The FTC takes the position that specific mention of
the debt is necessary, thus taking a rather narrow view of the
definition.1 7 The result of that narrow construction is that a col-
lector can leave a message for a consumer with a third party
without violating the prohibition against a collector's contact with
others, as long as the collector does not mention the debt.218 The
Commentary's construction causes more problems: a collector's
attempt to obtain information about a consumer's location begins
with a communication (assuming, therefore, a specific reference
to the debt), but yet the relevant § 1692b(2) forbids the collector's
The consumer in Jang alluded to this possibility, but the court did not see it as a problem
because the collector had indeed provided verification. See 122 F.3d at 484. Nevertheless,
in its concluding sentence, the court advised that "it [was] for Congress, and not the
courts, to close this alleged loophole in the FDCPA." Id.
214. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
215. Perhaps the statute puts the collector in an untenable position by requiring the
commitment that it "will obtain verification." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). It may be more pal-
atable to require a collector to seek verification. The debt may never have existed; there-
fore, the collector will not be able to obtain the requested verification. Nevertheless, the
collector should have an answer for the consumer.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). The FDCPA's definition is as follows: "The term
'communication' means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly
to any person through any medium." Id.
217. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,101.
218. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 4.6.1.
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statement that the consumer owes -any debt.219 Such a narrow
construction would also allow a collector to communicate with a
third party at least once, in contravention of the underlying prin-
ciple behind the FDCPA that a consumer's troubles should not be
broadcast to the world. The FDCPA gives a collector limited op-
portunities to ascertain the consumer's whereabouts without
delving into the consumer's affairs. 2 ' The definition of "communi-
cation" should therefore not be construed narrowly because it
does violence to the FDCPA and creates intolerable inconsisten-
cies.
A collector has the right to acquire location information about a
consumer from a third party.22' The statute requires the collector
to state that it is "confirming or collecting location informa-
tion."2 2 This use of the term "confirming" suggests that a collector
is expected to have some notion of the consumer's whereabouts
when it calls the third party for help. It is difficult for a collector
to confirm information that it does not have. Nevertheless, the
FTC takes the position that a collector "may not call third parties
under the pretense of gaining information already in his posses-
sion. ' The collector may indeed have information about the con-
sumer, but it may not be correct. The collector will not necessarily
know what it has until it makes that third-party call. As a result,
the collector may obtain information that alters the data in its
files.
The statute may be improved by clarifying that the collector
can communicate with third persons to acquire, confirm, or cor-
rect location information relating to the consumer. If the collector
contacts a third party for the purpose of acquiring location infor-
mation, it is incongruous for the collector to state that it is con-
firming information that it seeks to acquire. It is understandable
that a collector will want to confirm information that may be out-
dated;224 the statutory allowance for a third party contact is rea-
219. Id.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2000). The reason for the collector's contact is that the col-
lector is trying to collect a debt. If the collector can enjoy immunity from the FDCPA's re-
strictions by merely avoiding the discussion of the debt while seeking other relevant in-
formation, the statute will have failed to achieve its.purpose. After all, it is the conveying
of information either 'directly" or "indirectly" that matters. See id. § 1692a(2).
221. See id. § 1692b.
222. Id § 1692b(1).
223. FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
224. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.6.
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sonable in such circumstances.22' 5 But the contact in such a case
would not be strictly to acquire location information, because the
collector already has information about the consumer that may or
may not be current.226 The collector will be able to answer that
question only after the third party has shared what he knows.
A collector may not contact a third party for location informa-
tion more than once, unless the third party requests it or the col-
lector reasonably believes that the original information is incor-
rect or incomplete.227 The natural tendency is for the collector to
return to the third party if it believes that the latter subsequently
obtained correct or complete information. The third party may
have the correct information, but it is another question whether
he may be willing to part with it. The restriction on the collector
does not take this factor into account in determining whether
more than one communication is justified.22 Unless the collector's
conduct borders on harassment, the collector can justify its re-
peated calls on the third party because of its reasonable belief
that the third party now has the relevant data.229 The "more than
once" standard may not be sufficient to rein in a determined col-
lector that wants to find the consumer. Perhaps the statute re-
quires a limit on the other side.23 ° A collector cannot communicate
more than once under ordinary circumstances, but the collector's
zeal to obtain correct or complete information should not lead to
multiple third-party contacts.23'
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3).
226. The problem in this context is that the Official Staff Commentary cautions a col-
lector not to call third parties "under the pretense of gaining information already in his
possession." FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104. If the collector has good reason to
doubt the accuracy of the information, then the collector should be free to make the in-
quiry about the consumer's location.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3).
228. The statute only requires the collector's reasonable belief that the person's earlier
response was wrong and that the person now has the right information. Id. The person
may have given a wrong response earlier, but had the correct information all along. The
collector may want to persevere for as many times as it thinks will lead to success, short of
harassment.
229. See id.
230. Congress may merely have intended the collector to have one more shot at obtain-
ing location information once the person in possession thereof has the correct or complete
story. See id.
231. The problem may be avoided by authorizing a second contact when the erroneous
or incomplete information becomes correct or complete. By doing so, Congress would leave
no doubt that it contemplated no more than a single contact under ordinary circum-
stances.
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A collector who is seeking location information may identify his
employer only if the third party requests him to do so.232 If the
employer's name suggests that the employer is in the collection
business, the employee has to confront the statutory prohibition
against using any language in a communication that indicates
that the employer is in such a business.233 It would seem that the
employee is duty bound to identify his employer on request, and
that the employee has no flexibility in giving accurate informa-
tion about that even if the name readily discloses the nature of
the employer's business.234
B. Preventing Contacts with the Consumer
The statute restricts the kind of contacts that a collector can
have with a consumer.2" A collector cannot communicate with a
consumer at any unusual time or place, or at any time or place
"known or which should be known as inconvenient to the con-
sumer."2 36 This knowledge standard contains both subjective and
objective components. The "should be known" aspect imposes
some obligation on the collector to inquire about the consumer's
individual circumstances. 237 This should pose no difficulty in the
ordinary case, for the creditor will usually have a complete file on
the consumer that will provide relevant details about the con-
sumer's circumstances.
The statute takes a similar approach to contacts at the con-
sumer's place of employment.238 It prohibits a collector's commu-
nication with a consumer at the place of employment if the collec-
tor knows, or has reason to know, that the consumer's employer
objects to such contact.2 39 The understanding is that a collector
has a duty to inquire about the employer's policy in this regard,
and it is no excuse for a collector to make contact when it can as-
certain relevant information from the creditor, the consumer, or
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1).
233. See id. § 1692b(5).
234. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.6.
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (2000).
236. Id.; see Pittman v. J.J. Mac Intyre Co., 969 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Nev. 1997); Aus-
tin v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 557, 559 (D. Conn. 1993).
237. NCLC, supra note 89 § 5.3.2.4.
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3).
239. Id.
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others in a position to know the employer's position.240 The nature
of the employer's business may be a sufficient indicator of the
flexibility that a collector has in trying to contact the consumer.
In this regard, the collector that "has reason to know" about the
employer's policy is bound not to communicate with a consumer
at a time that "should be known" as inconvenient to the con-
sumer.
241
A collector is also restrained from contacting a consumer who is
represented by an attorney with respect to the debt in question.242
This statutory restriction does not impose an objective "should be
known" standard like that prescribed in the subsections relating
to contacts in the workplace2 43 or contacts at inconvenient
times.244 The collector must know about the attorney's represen-
tation.245 This raises a question about a collector's duty to ask a
creditor whether an attorney is involved. A collector may have
reason to know, without actually knowing, about an attorney.246
The statutory language suggests that the collector must have ac-
tual knowledge of the attorney's representation.247
The FTC takes the position that a creditor's knowledge will not
automatically be imputed to the debt collector. 24' The court in Mi-
care v. Foster & Garbus249 took refuge in that language and read
it as sanctioning imputation in certain circumstances. 2" A collec-
240. A collector may know from the credit application that the consumer holds a kind
of job that cannot tolerate routine calls. This should lead the collector to further inquiry if
it wants to make collection calls to that consumer. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11,
at 50,104.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a).
242. Id. § 1692c(a)(2).
243. Contact at the workplace is forbidden if the collector "knows or has reason to
know" about the prohibition. Id. § 1692c(a)(3).
244. Contact is forbidden at a time or place "known or which should be known to be
inconvenient." Id. § 1692c(a)(1).
245. Id. § 1692c(a)(2); see also Burger v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, 94 F. Supp. 2d 291,
293 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Herbert v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. Conn.
1994).
246. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3) (having reason to know of employer's prohibi-
tion), with id. § 1692c(a)(2) (knowing of attorney representation).
247. See Burger, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 293; Degonzague v. Weiss, Neuren & Neuren, 89 F.
Supp. 2d 282, 284 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Hubbard v. Nat'l Bond and Collection Assocs., Inc., 126
B.R. 422, 427 (D. Del. 1991), affd without opinion, 947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1991); FTC
Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
248. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
249. 132 F. Supp. 2d 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
250. Id. at 80-81. The court explained:
Although the FTC Commentary states that knowledge will not "automati-
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tor that establishes a practice of not inquiring about attorney
representation can safely attract files from creditors without run-
ning afoul of the statutory restriction.251 The Micare court viewed
this situation as one that required it to attribute the creditor's
knowledge to the collector.252 The collector could be held blame-
less only if a creditor withheld the information about representa-
tion after the collector asked the pertinent questions in accor-
dance with its own procedures.3
It is doubtful that the FTC intended to create such confusion by
using the word "automatically" in this context.254 If a creditor
knows about the representation and fails to tell the collector
about it, there is no statutory basis for asserting that the collector
also knows the facts. 255 It is one thing to hope that the creditor
will convey all material information when it turns over a file to
the collector. It is quite another to pin the failure to do so on the
collector.256 The danger in imposing a greater obligation on the
cally" be imputed to the debt collector, it does not state that such knowledge
cannot be imputed. Thus, imputing knowledge to the debt collector when it
does not inquire whether the debtor is represented by counsel gives full
meaning both to the FTC Commentary and to the protections afforded by the
FDCPA.
Id.
251. Id. at 80.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
255. See Micare, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 224; Jones v. Weiss, Neuren & Neuren, 95 F. Supp.
2d 105, 109 (N.D.N.Y 2000); Degonzague v. Weiss, Neuren & Neuren, 89 F. Supp. 2d 282,
284 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Hubbard v. Nat'l Bond and Collection Assocs., Inc., 126 B.R. 422, 427
(D. Del. 1991) affd without opinion, 947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1991). In Powers v. Professional
Credit Services, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), the court explained why it took
a different view of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2):
A creditor has a duty when turning over a file to his debt collector to convey
all of the material facts regarding the claim. The law mandates that the
debtor not be contacted when he has legal counsel. A creditor who has actual
knowledge of such fact cannot retain a debt collector and withhold such in-
formation to contravene the FDCPA's intent.
107 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169.
The court imputed the creditor's knowledge to the collector, contrary to the FDCPA's
plain language requiring the collector to know about the legal representation. The collec-
tor's ability to ascertain the attorney's name and address is not relevant until the collector
knows about the representation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(aX2) (2000).
256. In Degonzague, the consumer's claim was that the collector "knew or could have
reasonably ascertained that [the consumer] was represented."' 89 F. Supp. 2d at 283. The
consumer sent notice about his attorney to the creditor, not the collector, but the creditor
did not tell the collector anything about an attorney's involvement. 89 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
The court held that the creditor's knowledge could not be imputed to the collector. Id. The
assertion that the collector "could have reasonably ascertained" that the consumer had a
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
collector in this context is that it would equate a collector's actual
knowledge with its reason to know."' Congress recognized the
distinction in § 1692c(a)(3) when it forbade communication at a
consumer's place of employment if a "collector knows or has rea-
son to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the consumer
from receiving such communication."258 It is arguable indeed that
a collector should have a greater responsibility to ascertain the
facts relating to a consumer's legal representation. The present
language does not impose that obligation and, therefore, a collec-
tor should not have to investigate the matter to avoid the imputa-
tion of knowledge from the creditor.5 9
The court in Powers v. Professional Credit Services26 put the
responsibility on the collector because the creditor had actual
knowledge of the consumer's legal representation, but did not
share the information with the collector.2 ' The court was con-
cerned that "[permitting creditors to engage in such a limited
disclosure would utterly eviscerate the protections afforded debt-
ors by the FDCPA."262 While the creditor was actually in the
wrong for not disclosing the representation to the collector, the
language that prohibits communication with a consumer controls
the conduct of collectors and not that of creditors.2 63 Therefore,
while it may be less than admirable for a creditor to withhold in-
formation from a collector, one must look somewhere other than §
1692c(a)(2) for a remedy against the creditor.264
lawyer confused the requirements of §1692c(a)(2). Id. at 283-284. The collector must know
about the representation and must have "knowledge of," or be able to "readily ascertain"
the attorney's name and address. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). Ascertaining the attorney's
name and address follows the collector's knowledge of the representation. See id.
257. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), with id. § 1692c(a)(3).
258. Id. § 1692c(a)(3).
259. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.3. Some courts still recognize an affirmative duty
to inquire. The court in Micare v. Foster & Garbus believed that "imputing knowledge to
the debt collector when it does not inquire whether the debtor is represented by counsel
gives full meaning both to the FTC Commentary and to the protections afforded by the
FDCPA." 132 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
260. 107 F. Supp. 2d 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
261. Id. at 169.
262. Id.
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a).
264. The court in Powers reacted to the creditor's knowledge in this way: "[T]o allow a
creditor to hire a debt collector after receiving actual knowledge that the consumer has
retained legal representation for that debt and then withhold knowledge of this represen-
tation from the debt collector would blatantly circumvent the intent of the FDCPA." 107 F.
Supp. 2d at 168. If the creditor withholds information, it is hard to see how the collector
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There is also no hope for the application of constructive knowl-
edge, as the court in Hubbard v. National Bond & Collection As-
sociates, Inc. 265 was careful to point out.266 In Hubbard, the con-
sumer had reason to be optimistic that the court would find the
collector knowledgeable about the consumer's situation.267 After
all, the consumer had filed for bankruptcy and an attorney had
represented her in that proceeding.26 The consumer believed that
the collector should have discussed the bankruptcy and thus as-
certained the attorney's name.2 69 The court rejected the notion of
constructive knowledge in this context, explaining that even if the
collector knew about the bankruptcy, there was no way that the
previous representation would have satisfied the knowledge re-
quirement with respect to the debt in dispute. °
It is noteworthy that the statute forbids communication if the
collector knows that "the consumer is represented by an attor-
ney," but then the collector must either have "knowledge of, or [be
able to] readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address."27'
This suggests, therefore, that there is a difference between know-
ing about a consumer's legal representation and being able to as-
certain the attorney's name and address. 272 It is defensible for a
collector to communicate with a consumer despite its knowledge
of the consumer's representation if the collector cannot readily
ascertain the attorney's name and address. There may not be
many situations where a collector will find it difficult to obtain
further information about the attorney, but the statute recognizes
the possibility.273
If a collector knows about legal representation on one debt, it
does not mean that he is presumed to know about representation
on other debts of the same consumer.274 The limiting language
has violated the statute. Jones v. Weiss, Neuren & Neuren, 95 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108-09
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); Degonzague v. Weiss, Neuren & Neuren, 89 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
265. 126 B.R. 422 (D. Del. 1991).
266. Id. at 427.
267. See id. at 424-25.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 427.
270. Id.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2000).
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. Hubbard, 126 B.R. at 427; see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d
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"with respect to such debt" suggests that a consumer must prove
the collector's knowledge of the debt in question and that there is
no blanket application of knowledge about a consumer's debts.27
There is nothing to prevent a consumer from notifying a collector
that a specific attorney represents him on all debts, and if the
consumer does that, then the collector will know of attorney in-
volvement.276
A collector may communicate with a consumer if the con-
sumer's attorney does not respond to the collector within a rea-
sonable time.277 The interpretation of the term "reasonable time"
is subject to debate, and the FDCPA does not offer a solution by
using that terminology."7 Elsewhere in the statute Congress re-
quires action within a certain time;279 therefore, it is not clear
why it chose to leave this matter unsettled so that collectors and
attorneys do not have firm guidance about when they must act.
Thus, the statute should be amended to provide for a definite
time period for an attorney to respond to a collector's communica-
tion.28 o
Cir. 1991); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (C.D. Cal. 1991);
FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
275. See Goodman v. S. Credit Recovery, Inc., No. 97-2385, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340,
at *17 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 1999); Spinarski v. Credit Bureau, Inc., No. 95-0506, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22547, at *19-20 (D.N.M. Sept. 19, 1996); Robinson v. Transworld Sys., Inc.,
876 F. Supp. 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Masuda, 759 F. Supp. at 1464.
276. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
277. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).
278. See Blum v. Fisher & Fisher, P.C., 961 F. Supp. 1218, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (find-
ing that the reasonableness of a one-month period for consumer's attorney to respond pre-
sented question of fact precluding summary judgment); Phillips v. Amana Collection
Servs., No. 89-CV-1152 S, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13558, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1992)
(stating that the statute does not define what constitutes reasonable time and attorney's
failure to respond within two weeks did not warrant collector's direct communication with
consumer).
279. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(1), 1692g (2000).
280. An earlier bill prohibited a debt collector from communicating with a consumer
"while the consumer is represented by an attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond
within seven calendar days to any communication from the debt collector relating to the
consumer." H.R. 11969, 94th Cong. § 804 (a)(1)(D) (1976). Obviously, Congress thought
that "a reasonable period of time" was an improvement over "seven calendar days." Com-
pare id., with 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).
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V. SEIZING THE INITIATIVE
A. Stopping Communication
Consumers have a powerful weapon to stop debt collectors from
communicating with them. 28' A consumer can send a written no-
tice to the collector that he refuses to pay the debt or that he
wants the collector to cease communication.2 2 Once that happens,
the collector may no longer communicate with the consumer ex-
cept in very limited circumstances. 23 The collector may thereafter
make contact only to notify the consumer that it is terminating
its collection efforts, that it may invoke specified remedies that
the collector ordinarily invokes, or that it intends to invoke a
specified remedy.28 4
It is unfortunate that a collector does not have to inform the
consumer that the latter has the right to terminate the collector's
contact. 285 A consumer who knows that he has this right is more
likely to make this demand on the collector, and it would give a
consumer more time to decide what course of action he wants to
take in response to the collector's notice.28 6 If the statute required
a collector to combine the notice about the collector's obligation to
cease communication in this context with the notice of a collec-
tor's obligation to abandon its collection efforts when the con-
sumer disputes a debt, a consumer would be in a better position
to defend himself. If a collector is going to contact a consumer
about a debt, there is nothing inconsistent about requiring it to
include these options in the notice, especially when the validation
notice now requires a collector to inform the consumer about the
right to dispute the debt.28 7 The "cease communication" directive
does not prevent the collector from pursuing its remedies against
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. A consumer needs all the help he can get in protecting himself from a relentless
collector. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
When a default occurs, it is frequently because of some unforeseen event. Id. at 3. The
consumer's ability to stop the collector's communication is an important weapon in the col-
lection process.
286. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000), with id. § 1692c(c).
287. Id. § 1692g(a)(4).
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the consumer."88 The consumer should be informed, however, of
his right to be protected from possible harassment, especially if
the consumer is convinced that the collector has no basis for its
claims. Although the consumer may be willing to concede liability
for part of the debt, the collector may persist with its claim for a
larger amount in anticipation of the consumer's eventual surren-
der. If the consumer knows that he can keep the collector at bay
under these circumstances, he stands a better chance of settling
the matter.289
The collector's failure to call attention to the consumer's right
to stop the collector's communication can be especially advanta-
geous to the collector if there is more than one debt involved. The
consumer may feel the pressure under such circumstances and
may rush into an irresistible bargain with the collector to make
the collector go away. If the consumer asks a collector to cease
communication about a certain debt, this request will not affect
the collector's conduct in relation to the consumer's other debts.29°
The consumer must be careful, therefore, to repeat his request if
he wishes to restrict the collector's activities on another debt.29'
This is a reasonable interpretation because the reference in §
288. Id. § 1692c(c)(1)-(3) (2000). The collector still has the following options to commu-
nicate further with the consumer:
(1) [T]o advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being
terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke speci-
fied remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor;
or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor
intends to invoke a specified remedy.
Id.
289. An injunction or consent decree may sometimes require a collector to notify con-
sumers of this right to stop the collector's contacts. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.8.1 &
n.215.
290. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (stating that "[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in
writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt.., the debt collector shall not communi-
cate with the consumer with respect to such debt") (emphasis added). This language sug-
gests that the collector's obligation to cease communication must relate to a specific debt.
See id.
291. If the consumer has requested the collector to cease communication because of the
consumer's inability to pay the first debt, there is little likelihood that the consumer will
make payment on a subsequent debt. Nevertheless, if there is a time lag between the two
debts, it may be even more desirable for the consumer to make another request of the col-
lector to stop communicating. A similar observation may be made when a collector knows
that a consumer is represented by an attorney on one debt. The collector is not prevented
from contacting the consumer about other debts until it knows that the consumer is repre-
sented on those debts. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
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1692c(c) to "such debt" indicates that the statute covers the spe-
cific debts to which the consumer objects.292 The consumer's reac-
tion to that debt, therefore, does not control the collector's con-
duct in other matters.293
A consumer must not be ambiguous when he notifies the collec-
tor to cease communicating. In Shrestha v. State Credit Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc.,294 the consumer conveyed his wishes this way:
"I would be ever grateful to you, if you please do not take any ac-
tion against me. I would appreciate if you please write me with
your advice or give me a call."295 The consumer was obviously so-
liciting the collector's sympathy and did not want the collector to
extend its collection efforts. The consumer did not expect the col-
lector's call to cause him more distress. He was merely looking for
a way out of his predicament, but the language he used in seeking
the collector's help was a far cry from that which should be con-
tained in a "cease and desist" letter.296 The lesson to be learned
from this is that a consumer does not have to be particularly pol-
ished in asserting his right to stop the collector's communication.
He does not even have to explain his reason for exercising that
right.297 In many cases, the consumer's attorney will take over the
matter, and the consumer will not have to worry any longer about
confronting the collector. But even if there is no attorney in the
picture, the statute offers the consumer an opportunity to get
some respite from the collector by merely notifying the collector in
writing that the consumer refuses to pay or that he wants the col-
lector to cease further communication.298 The consumer's willing-
ness to exceed the simple statutory notice will sometimes cause
more harm than good.
292. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c); see also NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.8.1.
293. See NCLC, supra note 89, § 5.3.8.1.
294. 117 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2000).
295. Id. at 146 (alteration in original).
296. Id. The consumer's letter invited the collector to respond to the consumer with ad-
vice. Id. This was different from asking the collector to cease communicating. See id.
297. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). The consumer may simply indicate his refusal to pay the
debt or ask the collector to stop communicating. See id. However, a consumer may find it
helpful to explain his individual circumstances and to document any unfair practices
which the collector has utilized in trying to collect the debt.
298. See id.
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B. Making One Last Contact
The purpose of § 1692c(c) is to allow a consumer to halt a col-
lector's contacts with the consumer; at least two of the exceptions
give the collector one last chance to notify the consumer of the
remedies that it ordinarily pursues, or the specific remedies that
it intends to pursue.299 The collector cannot, however, use the
statutory exceptions as a cover to continue its collection activi-
ties.3"' This strategy would certainly dilute the effectiveness of
the consumer's demand to cease and desist. The provision seems
to give a collector a last clear chance to impress the consumer
with the seriousness of its collection, efforts, and in that sense it
may serve a salutary purpose in bringing the matter to a satisfac-
tory conclusion. 31 A consumer will certainly welcome a notice
that the collector is terminating its collection efforts. The con-
sumer will hardly experience the same elation about information
relating to the collector's remedies. Sometimes there is disagree-
ment over whether a collector's last contact with a consumer re-
lates to invocation of a remedy or constitutes further communica-
tion about the debt.
The issue arose in Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc.3 °2 when
a collector sent the consumer a letter after the consumer's request
that the collector cease communication.3 3 The question was
whether the collector's letter was a demand for payment or a no-
tice about the collector's remedies. 34 The court viewed the letter
as a settlement offer and therefore, a remedy, because it was the
collector's attempt to settle the debt with the consumer without
litigation. 3 5 The collector invited the consumer to select one of
the payment options listed in the letter and make payment ac-
cordingly. 3 6 The consumer was welcome to call the collector if he
had any questions.30
7
299. Id. § 1692c(c)(2)-(3).
300. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,105 ("A debt collector's response to a
'cease communication' notice from the consumer may not include a demand for payment,
but is limited to the three statutory exceptions.").
301. See 15 U.S.C. § 16926(c).
302. 135 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1998).
303. Id. at 395.
304. Id. at 398.
305. Id. at 399.
306. Id. at 396.
307. Id.
[Vol. 37:511
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The court was persuaded that the collector's noncoercive set-
tlement offer was consistent with the language and purpose of the
FDCPA. °' It is open to question, however, whether the collector
fell within the exception by its attempt to facilitate payment
through the available payment plans." 9
It depends, of course, on whether the collector was dealing with
a specified remedy that it normally invoked to recover its debt.
The plain fact is that the collector offered the consumer an oppor-
tunity to pay the debt, and the collector thought that it would
make it more palatable for the consumer to do so by setting out
the available options.311 This was not a communication that was
intended to inform the consumer about the collector's usual pro-
cedures for recovering the debt. 2 It was closer to a last ditch ef-
fort to get the consumer to see things in a different perspective; if
not, the collector would not have been discussing "payment ar-
rangements" and "payment plans."313
The court in Lewis was impressed by the fact that the letter
could not be construed as an example of collection abuse.31 6 But
308. Id. at 398.
309. It is true that a collector may give the consumer notice of all the remedies that it
normally pursues and the statute does not require the collector to invoke any specific rem-
edy. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2) (2000). But one may legitimately view the collector's com-
munication as a disguised demand for payment. The collector wanted to give the consumer
'an opportunity to pay [the] debt." Lewis, 135 F.3d at 396. The payment plans offered by
the collector were the mechanism for achieving that objective. See id. The collector there-
fore wanted to facilitate the consumer's response to the demand for payment. See id.
310. See 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c).
311. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 396. The collector may notify the.consumer about the remedies
it normally invokes. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2). The collector does not depend on the con-
sumer's cooperation for the invocation of such remedies. A payment plan can only be suc-
cessful with the consumer's cooperation, and results from the collector's demand for pay-
ment. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
312. See 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c).
313. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 396. The letter contained the following relevant language:
IN A PERCENTAGE OF CASES, I FIND THAT PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN OFFERED BY OUR
AFFILIATED OFFICE. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PAY THIS DEBT, PLEASE SELECT ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND ENCLOSE PAYMENT,
OR PROVIDE ME WITH A NUMBER WHERE I CAN CONTACT YOU TO
DISCUSS TERMS.
Id. The collector therefore asked the consumer to "pay" by choosing one of the "payment"
schedules, suggesting that the collector was still making a demand, even if politely. Id.
314. Id. at 399. One of the FDCPA's purposes is "to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000). The court was justified in consid-
ering whether the collection letter was just another abusive tactic in the collector's arse-
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the prohibition against further contact does not depend on the
kindly nature of the communication.315 Unless the collector can
bring itself within one of the statutory exceptions, it must accede
to the consumer's request to stop further contact. 16 The letter in
question was an invitation to pay, which the consumer could eas-
ily refuse." 7 A remedy originates with the collector and does not
necessarily depend on the consumer's cooperation.318 Once a con-
sumer puts a halt to a collector's efforts, the collector should not
be able to seek resolution again with the consumer.3 9 The collec-
tor's ability to prolong the consumer's agony in this way weakens
the statutory mandate. 32 ° It is inconsistent with the nature of the
right inherent in § 1692c(c).
nal. See Lewis, 135 F.3d at 398-400. However, the court was led astray by the tame lan-
guage of the collection letter, finding it "less coercive and more protective of the interests
of the debtor." Id. at 399. The court should have been more concerned with the consumer's
right to put an end to all the collector's communication, regardless of the collector's diplo-
matic approach. This right is so important that the Commentary recognizes that the term
"communicate" must be given its commonly accepted meaning, so that any contact with
the consumer is forbidden once the consumer acts, whether or not the collector specifically
mentions the debt. See FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
315. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2000). The basic issue is whether the collector is notify-
ing the consumer about the remedies it intends to pursue. Once the consumer has asked
the collector to stop contact, the collector should no longer be discussing payment options
with the consumer. It is too late for that.
316. FTC Commentary, supra note 11, at 50,104.
317. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 396. The collector could not have been any more direct: "FOR
YOUR CONVENIENCE, I CAN ARRANGE FOR YOU TO PAY YOUR ACCOUNT USING
VISA AND/OR MASTERCARD." Id.
318. It has been said that "[o]ur system of contract remedies is not directed at compul-
sion of promisors to prevent breach; it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress
breach." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 756 (3d ed. 1999). Furthermore,
one can identify "remedies" as "[t]he field of law dealing with the means of enforcing rights
and redressing wrongs." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1296 (7th ed. 1999). When a collector
reaches the point of contemplating remedies, the die has been cast and the collector should
then be telling the consumer what to expect in terms of enforcement. If the collector wants
to make one last attempt to recover the debt by setting out some repayment terms, it is
doubtful that the collector is invoking remedies at that point. The collector is still appeal-
ing to the consumer under that scenario. The important point is that the statute does not
prevent a collector from invoking legal process against an uncooperative consumer. See
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995).
319. It is the consumer who decides whether the collector can continue its communica-
tion with the consumer. The collector may feel that it is on the brink of success, but it can-
not continue its collection efforts except for the specified remedies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c
(c)(2)-(3).
320. In one case, a collector sent at least six letters in eighteen months demanding
payment from the consumer even after the consumer had notified the collector that he had
paid the debt. Florence v. Nat'l Sys., No. C82-2020A, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20344, at *7
(N.D. Ga. 1983); see also Herbert v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 76, 79-80 (D.
Conn. 1994) (noting that the collector called consumer directly four weeks after consumer's
attorney advised collector that consumer did not owe the debt and therefore, refused to
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Despite a consumer's pleas to the collector to cease communica-
tion, the collector may still make one last call "to advise the con-
sumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being termi-
nated."321 This is one of the exceptions to the general rule that the
collector must respect the consumer's request about no further
contact. 22 One wonders about the utility of this provision. The
consumer who is resisting a collector should worry about a collec-
tor's interest in giving him the good news about terminating col-
lection. If a collector has been pursuing a consumer for several
months and the consumer finally rebuffs the collector, that should
end the communication. 23 The collector is then free to seek its le-
gal remedy, but not to harass the consumer under the guise of
giving the consumer some final parting news.324 If there is no fur-
ther contact, the consumer will realize soon enough what has
happened. It takes some imagination, however, to think that the
collector will restrict the call to the good news of complying with
the consumer's request. 2 ' One collector's promise to terminate
further efforts does not prevent another collector from taking up
the challenge. 326 Therefore, even if a consumer is comforted by
pay); Carrigan v. Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 824, 825-28 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (finding that collector violated statute by contacting consumer nine months after
consumer notified collector to stop communicating).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(1).
322. See id.
323. The statute allows the collector to advise the consumer that "the debt collector's
further efforts are being terminated." Id. This relates to that debt collector, but the credi-
tor is still in control of the matter and the consumer may be lulled into a false sense of se-
curity.
324. See id. If the consumer has convinced the collector that the consumer does not owe
the debt, there may be some basis for the collector's further communication to put the con-
sumer's mind at ease. It is not unusual for consumers to be hounded for debts they do not
owe. A House Committee reported:
Consumers who are victims of computer error find it extremely difficulty to
obtain correction of records which have led to collection agency harassment.
It is interesting to note that of the thousands of letters received by your
Committee concerning debt collection problems, most of the letters were from
individuals who did not owe the debt in the first place or were people who
were making legitimate attempts to repay the money but the payments were
not being made fast enough to suit the debt collectors.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1202, at 5 (1976).
325. The statute requires the consumer to notify the collector in writing that he does
not want to hear from the collector any more. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). The collector's further
communication that the collector is terminating its collection efforts does not have to be in
writing. See id. § 1692c(c)(1). This last opportunity for the collector to communicate may
be more useful to leave the consumer in a state of confusion. The collector may be termi-
nating its contact, but that may not necessarily be the end of the matter.
326. See id. § 1692c(c). It has been suggested that a creditor may violate a state's un-
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one collector's reassurance, he cannot be sure that someone else
will not take on the assignment following hard on the last conver-
sation with the previous collector. After all is said and done, giv-
ing a collector one last clear chance to make contact with the con-
sumer does not make life easier for the consumer. It only opens
the door to further conflict about the details of the last contact be-
tween the parties.
Since mail notification from the consumer is complete when the
collector receives it,"7 a collector will be liable for making any
subsequent communication with the consumer even if the collec-
tor has no actual knowledge of the consumer's request to cease
communication.32 Although this language creates absolute liabil-
ity for a collector, in Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc.,"' the
Sixth Circuit found a way out for the collector who received a
"cease communication" notice at its office in Ohio.33 ° Nevertheless,
the collector's office in California sent out a collection letter to the
consumer shortly thereafter.33' The court upheld the collector's
bona fide error defense because it was convinced that the collec-
tion letter went out despite the collector's maintenance of proce-
dures that the collector had adopted to avoid such errors. 32
Collectors should not take much comfort from this decision, for
the collector in Smith took on a difficult challenge in meeting the
demands of the bona fide error defense. A collector should wait a
reasonable time before following up with another demand let-
ter.333 A consumer will want to use all modern commercial facili-
fair and deceptive acts and practices statute by bringing another collector into the picture
after a consumer has asked a previous collector to cease contact. NCLC, supra note 89, §
5.3.8.2 & n.230. It may also be an issue of the violation of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, Id.
327. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
328. See Kaschak v. Raritan Valley Collection Agency, No. 88-3763, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19103, at *17-18 (D.N.J. May 23, 1989) (finding collector liable for mailing letter
the day after receiving consumer's "cease communication" notice even though collector had
not yet processed consumer's notice).
329. 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992).
330. Id. at 1027.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1031. The collector can avoid liability if it can show "that the violation was
not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2000).
333. Smith, 953 F.2d at 1034 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). The collector had a computer
system in place that made it impossible for the collector to comply with § 1692c(c). Id. at
1036 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). It was questionable, therefore, whether the collector had
procedures in place to avoid mailing collection letters after receiving a cease and desist
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ties to prove when the collector received his request. Once the
consumer does that, the collector will then have the burden of ex-
empting itself from the presumption that mail notification has oc-
curred." 4 This approach to the consumer's "cease communication"
directive is consistent with the underlying statutory objective of
controlling the possibilities of harassment, since a collector can-
not feign ignorance once the consumer can show that the collector
received the communication. The test is therefore not whether the
collector knows about the consumer's mailing, but whether the
collector received it.
VI. QUESTIONABLE COLLECTION TACTICS
A. Deception and Misleading Statements
Congress passed the FDCPA to protect consumers from abusive
and deceptive collection practices.33 Nevertheless, collectors have
not flinched from the challenge of crafting suitable language to
impress consumers with the seriousness of their demands. In so
doing, collectors have to worry about the possibility that their
message may be construed as false and misleading.336 The collec-
tor wants the consumer to feel that there will be serious conse-
quences if the consumer does not respond to the collector's de-
mands. This is where certain "magical" words play their part. The
last thing that a consumer wants to accept is a collector's invita-
tion to the legal arena when the collector makes no bones about
what the result will be. In pursuing its goal, the collector may not
threaten to take action that it really does not intend to take or
that it cannot legally take.33 As long as the consumer is under
the impression that the collector means business, the collector
has achieved its purpose regardless of whether it acts or not.33
order from the consumer. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
334. The statute recognizes that "[i]f such notice from the consumer is made by mail,
notification shall be complete upon receipt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2000).
335. Id. § 1692(e) (2000).
336. See id. The FDCPA forbids a collector from using "any false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." Id.
337. See id. § 1692e(5).
338. See United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the collector falsely threatened legal action); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collec-
tion Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the collector referred to garnishment
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An example of a collector's suggestive language appeared in
Withers v. Eveland,3 9 where the collector informed the consumer
that it had been retained to institute collection proceedings
against the consumer.34 ° If the consumer did not contact the col-
lector or pay in full, the collector would pursue "all legal reme-
dies." '341 What was the consumer to think about this type of collec-
tion effort? The collector used the right words to impress the
consumer. The court found that it was reasonable for the con-
sumer to interpret the letter as a threat of legal action unless the
consumer paid the debt.342 The only problem was that the collec-
tor, who was not a lawyer, could not legally bring an action
against the consumer, and the court found that the collector's
threat to do so violated the statute.343
Even when a collector does not make the mistake of threaten-
ing legal action on its own, it may nevertheless run into trouble
by threatening action by its attorney without further notice. 144 If
the creditor has not authorized the collector to bring suit, the col-
lector is on shaky ground in threatening action by an attorney.
The threat of immediate legal action may, nevertheless, prod the
consumer into paying the debt. It is the consumer's impression
that counts. The consumer will not know if the collector has the
authority to retain counsel. All that matters is the collector's
threat to take an action that he cannot legally take or that he
does not intend to take.
and attachment although not authorized to proceed); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566,
571 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the collector's threat to take legal action within one week
was deceptive because consumer had thirty days to cure); Van Westrienen v. Americonti-
nental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101 (D. Or. 2000) (finding that the collector
threatened to sue before it had legal right to do so); Drennan v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 950
F. Supp. 858, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that the consumer stated a claim where collector
made threats of legal action but no action was taken for over a year).
339. 988 F. Supp. 942 (E.D. Va. 1997).
340. Id. at 946.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. The collector improperly threatened legal action in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1692e(5), (10) (2000).
344. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat'l Bus. Factors, 897 F. Supp. 455, 457 (D. Nev. 1995)
(holding that the collector's threat that attorney would be authorized to proceed without
further notice violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) since collector did not have authority to begin
legal proceedings); United States v. ACB Sales & Service, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561, 572 (D.
Ariz. 1984) (finding that the statement that collector was authorized to proceed with legal
action was false and therefore, collector had no intent to bring suit).
[Vol. 37:511
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Sometimes a slight inaccuracy will come back to haunt a collec-
tor. In Duffy v. Landberg,345 the collector demanded a "$100 civil
penalty" from a consumer whose check had been dishonored.346
The collector's demand was close to the mark, except that the
state statute governing collections on a dishonored check actually
provided for the recovery of "'the amount of the check plus a civil
penalty of up to $100 or up to 100 percent of the value of the
check, whichever is greater."'347 Even so, the consumer could
avoid this civil penalty altogether if the parties settled the matter
without going to court.34 The collector did not, therefore, tell the
whole story, because it asked the consumer for the civil penalty
as part of the settlement even though the state statute did not al-
low it at that stage.349
There is surely a difference between a flat "$100 civil penalty"
and a civil penalty of "up to $100." The subtle difference could not
have escaped the collector's notice, but the collector must have
wanted to impress the consumer with this misleading representa-
tion. The same could be said about the collector's attempt to re-
cover legal fees, which state law prohibited because the amounts
of the dishonored checks were less than $1250.3" ° When the illegal
penalty and fees were added to the legal charges, the collector
was sure to be in a good position to intimidate.3 ' Many consum-
ers would succumb to this threat rather than face the prospect of
fighting the collector under these circumstances.
345. 215 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000).
346. Id. at 873.
347. Id. at 874 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 332.50(2)(a)(1) (West 1995)).
348. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 332.50(2)(c)).
349. See id. This was a misrepresentation of Minnesota law, resulting in a violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (2000). Id.
350. Duffy, 215 F.3d at 874.
351. The court applied the unsophisticated consumer standard, which relates to con-
sumers of below average sophistication without having to sink to the last rung on the so-
phistication ladder. See id. at 874-75; see also Gammon v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d
1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). An unsophisticated consumer would have been misled into
thinking that the collector could collect attorney's fees under these circumstances. Duffy,
215 F.3d, at 875. Other courts rely on the "least sophisticated standard," which "(1) en-
sures the protection of all consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against deceptive
debt collection practices, and (2) protects debt collectors against liability for bizarre or
idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices." Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320
(2d Cir. 1993); see also Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992); Graziano v. Harrison, 950
F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991); Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Occasionally a collector will not allow the lack of a license to
deter it from pursuing a consumer. The question then becomes
whether the collector has threatened to take action that it cannot
legally take,3 52 or even whether it has used a deceptive means to
accomplish its objective. 53 The resolution of this question de-
pends in large measure on the interpretation of the word
"threaten" in § 1692e(5)." 4 If the statute focuses on the collector's
intent to recover funds for the creditor, then the threat relates to
the collector's conduct that might ensue from the consumer's fail-
ure to respond to the collector's demands.3 55 The consumer will ei-
ther pay or suffer the consequences. On the other hand, if the col-
lector merely seeks to collect without describing the consequences
that might flow from a consumer's failure to pay, it is not threat-
ening any action at all because it has already made the attempt
at collection. 56
Is it possible, however, to construe the collection attempt as the
collector's threat to perform in an unlicensed capacity? The court
in Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc.,357 certainly took this position when it
decided that attempting to collect a debt without the appropriate
license constituted a threat to take an action that the collector
could not legally take.358 The court equated the attempt to collect
with the threat to do the real thing, that is, to act as a debt collec-
tor.359 But the question remains whether the attempt was a part
352. See, e.g., Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. Va. 1995).
353. See, e.g., Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Md. 1999).
354. A threat may be defined as "[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on an-
other or on another's property," "[a]n indication of an approaching menace," or "[a] person
or thing that might well cause harm." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1489-90 (7th ed. 1999).
355. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that a threat to transfer file to an attorney constituted threat of legal action); Van We-
strienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102 (D. Or. 2000)
(holding that a collection letter that threatened garnishment within five days violated §
1692e(5) because garnishment could not be accomplished within that period); Raimondi v.
McAllister & Assocs., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 825, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that a threat to
contact consumer's employer violated § 1692e(5) in light of prohibition under § 1692c(b)).
356. See Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that a col-
lection letter indicating that legal action was an available option did not threaten suit);
Gaetano v. Payco of Wis., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1404, 1408-09 (D. Conn. 1990) (finding that a
statement that collector would use "ALL APPROVED MEANS... TO COLLECT DEBTS"
did not implicitly threaten suit).
357. 913 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. La. 1995).
358. See id. at 471-72; see also Russey v. Rankin, 911 F. Supp. 1449, 1459 (D.N.M.
1995); Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1451-52 (D. Nev. 1994);
Gaetano, 774 F. Supp. at 1414.
359. Sibley, 913 F. Supp. at 471. The court said as much: "[W]hen Firstcollect at-
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of the collection process, and thus not a threat by itself. The col-
lector has to keep trying until it is successful. It employs a threat
only to cover the possibility that the consumer will not cooperate.
If there is no threat, then one will have to find some other basis
for finding the mere unlicensed attempt to collect a debt to be a
violation of the FDCPA.
The court in Wade v. Regional Credit Ass'n36 took a better ap-
proach to the problem by recognizing the collection notice as a
way of reminding the consumer about the outstanding debt.361
There was no hint of a threat to sue or take other legal action.6 2
It was true that the notice contained the mandatory statutory
language that the consumer was attempting to collect a debt and
that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. 63
But the collector had no choice but to include that language.
364 If
it had not done so, it would have opened itself up to the charge
that it had made a deceptive or misleading representation in con-
nection with the collection of the debt.365
The disclosure of the collector's objective is not the equivalent
of a threat. The FDCPA recognizes that a collector will want to
get its money, but the statute prevents the collector from using
unsavory tactics to achieve its goal.366 Making a request for pay-
tempted to collect the debt from the plaintiff, it was threatening to take an action that it
could not legally take, namely, act as a debt collector... ." Id.
360. 87 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1996).
361. Id. at 1100.
362. Id. The California collector, not licensed in Idaho, sent the following notice to the
consumer in Idaho:
WHY HAVEN'T WE HEARD FROM YOU? OUR RECORDS STILL SHOW
THIS AMOUNT OWING. If not paid TODAY, it may STOP YOU FROM
OBTAINING credit TOMORROW. PROTECT YOUR CREDIT
REPUTATION. SEND PAYMENT TODAY.
DO NOT DISREGARD THIS NOTICE. YOUR CREDIT MAY BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED. CONTACT US IMMEDIATELY.
Id. at 1099.
363. Id.
364. See 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11) (2000).
365. See Wade, 87 F.3d at 1099. At the time of the transaction, the collector had to dis-
close in all communications that it was attempting to collect a debt and that any informa-
tion obtained would be used for that purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (1994). The stat-
ute was amended in 1996 to require the same disclosure in the collector's initial
communication. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2305(a), 110
Stat. 3009-425 (1996) (codified as amended at § 1692e). After that, the collector merely
had to disclose that the communication was from a debt collector. Id.
366. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f(2000).
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ment is not the same thing as threatening a consumer with cer-
tain action for failing to comply.
36 7
There is something somewhat disconcerting about a collector's
failure to meet the relevant registration requirements. But the
question is not whether the collector has satisfied the jurisdic-
tional obligation, but whether it has threatened the consumer in
a legally indefensible way, all with the intent to guarantee its
success in recovering the unpaid debt. 6 It would make a differ-
ence if the collector held itself out as a licensed collection
agency.369 A consumer could then make the point that the collec-
tor was trying to mislead or deceive him, and he should have the
better argument under § 1692e(10). 7 °
There was no pretense of that sort in Ferguson v. Credit Man-
agement Control, Inc.,37 and the court followed Wade despite the
disposition of some other district courts.372 The Ferguson court
viewed the collection letter as merely providing the consumer
with "information concerning the status of his debt."373 It was "in-
formation for the debtor's benefit."374 The message in Ferguson
was certainly different from that in Gaetano v. Payco of Wiscon-
sin, Inc.,37  where the collector threatened to use "ALL
APPROVED MEANS... TO COLLECT DEBTS AND THAT
ANY INFORMATION... [WOULD] BE USED AS A BASIS TO
ENFORCE COLLECTION OF THE DEBT."37 6 It was not surpris-
367. See Wade, 87 F.3d at 1100. As the court in Wade pointed out, "[tlhe body of the
[collection] notice was informational, notifying Wade that failure to pay could adversely
affect her credit reputation. There was no threat to sue. The least sophisticated debtor
would construe the notice as a prudential reminder, not as a threat to take action." Id.
368. The issue is whether debt collection practices that may violate state law are per se
violations of the FDCPA. See id. The court in Wade looked in vain for the collector's threat.
Id. However, the court in Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. La. 1995), saw
the collection letter itself as a threat by the collector to act as a collector without a license.
See id. at 471.
369. See Wade, 87 F. 3d at 1100.
370. In such a case, the collector would be using a "false representation or deceptive
means" as a strategy to collect, contrary to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
371. 140 F.2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
372. See id. at 1302-03. But see Sibley, 913 F. Supp. at 471; Russey v. Rankin, 911 F.
Supp. 1449, 1451-52 (D.N.M. 1995); Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F. Supp.
1443 (D. Nev. 1994); Gaetano v. Payco of Wis., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1404, 1414 (D. Conn.
1990).
373. 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
374. Id.
375. 774 F. Supp. at 1404.
376. Id. at 1408. Although the court in Gaetno did not explain its reasoning, it may
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ing that the Gaetano court saw this language as threatening an
action that the collector could not legally enforce because it
lacked a state license.377 The threat of enforcement had no legal
support.
378
A false or misleading representation can take many forms. In
Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc., 9 the collector tried to convince
the consumer that it meant business by using this language: "[Ihf
legal action is taken, you will be responsible for attorneys fees,
court costs, and pre-judgment interest, as allowed by your con-
tract."38 ° The collector did not tie the consumer's obligation for
such items to the success of the lawsuit. 81 The consumer was left
with the impression that he would ultimately be liable for such
costs and fees if the collector merely brought suit.382 A consumer
who was confused by this message might succumb to pressure
rather than await the possibility of being saddled with unpredict-
able expenses that would ensue from a mere filing.383 This was
the type of leverage that the FDCPA was intended to eliminate.
There are other avenues of fear for the consumer. If a collector
promises that it will investigate the consumer's financial situa-
tion through the consumer's employers, the consumer may be in-
fluenced by this strategy. The FDCPA says that he should not be,
since it forbids a collector from communicating with a consumer's
employer under these circumstances.
384
have been persuaded that the collector's intention not only to "collect" but also to "enforce"
the debt put the collector in the position of threatening to take action that it could not le-
gally take. See id. at 1414-15.
377. Id. at 1415.
378. See id.
379. 81 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Md. 1999).
380. Id. at 593.
381. See id. In the case of a successful action under the FDCPA, a consumer can re-
cover the "costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2000). In Spencer, the collector conveyed the impres-
sion that the consumer would be liable for costs, fees, and interest once the collector filed
suit, without regard to the outcome of the action. See 81 F. Supp. 2d at 593-94.
382. Id.
383. Id. The least sophisticated consumer might be led to believe that he has no de-
fenses to the collector's suit. See id.
384. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2000); see also Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Servs. Inc., 869
F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989); Raimondi v. McAllister & Assocs., 50 F. Supp. 2d 825 (N.D. Ill.
1999); Sluys v. Hand, 831 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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B. Imminence of a Lawsuit
Collectors frequently depend on their ability to convey the im-
pression that a lawsuit is imminent. This possibility will nor-
mally drive a consumer into a frenzy, thus creating the right cli-
mate for the consumer to panic without really putting up a fight.
Courts will look for any language that suggests that a collector
threatened to take action that it did not intend to take.
In Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc.,"' there was
some ambiguity about the collector's intentions because one letter
seemed to conflict with the other."6 The first letter informed the
consumer that the collector's client had informed the collector "to
proceed with whatever legal means [were] necessary to enforce
collection."" 7 The second letter gave a similar message that a de-
cision had to be made about how to enforce collection.388 The sig-
nificant item in this second letter was the collector's declaration
that the collector had not taken, and was not taking, any legal ac-
tion against the consumer.8 9
C. Sorting out the Confusion
Despite the collector's disavowal of a pending action, the court,
nevertheless, read the two statements about collection as suggest-
ing that legal action was imminent.39° No doubt the court inter-
preted the collector's language to mean that the creditor had al-
ready authorized collection and that it was only a matter of time
before the collector would bring a lawsuit.39' The collector con-
veyed the impression that although it was taking no action at the
moment, it was soon going to decide on the direction to be taken
in enforcing collection. 92 The court found that the creditor had re-
tained the authority to decide on any legal action; therefore, the
385. 6 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
386. See id. at 61-62.
387. Id. at 61.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 61-62.
390. Id. at 62.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 61-62.
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collector's posturing supported the consumer's claim that the col-
lector did not intend to take any immediate action.393
The collector employed a similar strategy in Morgan v. Credit
Adjustment Board, Inc.,394 when it urged the consumers to pay in
full "[tlo stop further action."395 It was clear from the record that
the collector's practice was to telephone the consumer if the con-
sumer did not respond to the collector's letter.396 The court felt
that the collector's threat of "future action" might mislead the
consumer.397 It was likely that the consumer would be confused
about whether the threatened action was legal in nature, and this
confusion might create a false sense of urgency in the consumer's
mind.398
The problem with many collection letters is that consumers can
read them as having at least two meanings, one of which is inac-
curate.39 9 This is why some courts will find the collector's lan-
guage deceptive. In Russell v. Equifax A.R.S.,4°° the collector duti-
fully gave the consumer a validation notice as part of the
collection package, but also advised that if the consumer paid the
debt within ten days, it would not post the collection to its file.4" 1
The consumer was in a quandary. Did she have thirty days to dis-
pute the debt or did she have to pay within ten days to avoid
credit problems later?0 2 The court was satisfied that the demand
for payment not only overshadowed and contradicted the lan-
guage giving the consumer the right to dispute the debt within
thirty days, but also that the notice was deceptive because it was
"reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading."0 3
393. See id. at 63; see also Irwin v. Mascott, 112 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Mor-
gan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1998); Edwards v. Nat'l
Bus. Factors, 897 F. Supp. 455 (D. Nev. 1995).
394. 999 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1998).
395. Id. at 804.
396. Id. at 807.
397. Id.
398. The test is the capacity of the collection letter to mislead, not whether the letter
actually misled the consumer. See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
399. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993); Dutton v. Wolhar, 809
F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (D. Del. 1992).
400. 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
401. Id. at 32.
402. Id. at 34.
403. Id. at 35.
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When the collector sent out a second notice twenty days after
the first notice that demanded payment in five days, the collector
aggravated the problem." 4 The collector's action now reduced the
consumer's dispute period to twenty-five days, and the consumer
had to decide how to reconcile the two notices that she had re-
ceived.0 5 The court viewed this second notice as deceptive be-
cause it sent a message that was "open to an inaccurate yet rea-
sonable interpretation by the consumer."
40 6
The significant feature in cases like Russell is that deception is
predicated on the overshadowing and contradictory nature of the
collection demands in relation to the validation notice. The collec-
tor can confuse the consumer with language that suggests that
the consumer does not really have thirty days to dispute the debt,
and it can do this through the capacity of the statement to mis-
lead.40 7 The collector can solve this problem by reconciling its
payment demand with the consumer's rights under the validation
notice. 08 The collector runs into difficulty when it leaves the vali-
dation notice as a mere formal disclosure without making any at-
tempt to link it to the continuing efforts to collect the debt.409 The
consumer is left to unravel the mystery for himself; while the col-
lector hopes, of course, that the consumer will be influenced more
by the demand for payment than by the statutory provision for
disputing the debt. There is something to be said for taking away
the incentive for the collector to create a climate of confusion sur-
rounding the collector's communication with the consumer. The
collector should be required to provide, in its initial communica-
tion, basic information about the debt and the accompanying
validation notice. There should then be a hiatus of twenty-one
days before the collector can make any demands or threats.
That would give the consumer an opportunity to decide on his
course of action without having to interpret the conflict between
the validation notice and the collector's demand for action within
404. Id. at 33.
405. Id. at 36.
406. Id.; see also United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir.
1996); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
407. Russell, 74 F.3d at 36; Nat'l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139.
408. See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997); Russell, 74 F.3d at 34.
409. See, e.g., Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500; Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d
482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991).
410. This proposal would require the collector to suspend its collection activities during
this interim period and inform the consumer of that fact.
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a certain time.411 The deceptive nature of the collector's language
is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g (validation) and 1692e (mis-
leading statements). The removal of the contradicting and over-
shadowing language solves the problem under both sections,
while allowing the consumer to enjoy the security of being able to
lodge his dispute without worrying about the collector's demands.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the FDCPA has offered consumers
some protection from aggressive debt collectors. There is, how-
ever, room for improvement. It is obvious that some parts of the
statute have turned out to be troublesome for the collections in-
dustry, and the validation notice requirementis at the head of
that list.412 While this provision has caused many headaches, it is
not too late to make some adjustments for the good of consumers
and collectors alike. In doing so, Congress must keep in mind the
interests of the constituencies affected by the statute. Congress
wanted the consumer to know that the consumer has a right to
dispute the debt, but it did not necessarily want to interrupt the
ongoing collection activities while the consumer is trying to de-
cide whether to exercise his right.413 The collector, therefore, finds
itself in a position that almost invites contradiction and over-
shadowing. The collector must be careful to give the consumer
proper notice while pressing on with its assignment to recover the
debt. The collector must always be conscious of the way in which
the least sophisticated consumer is going to interpret its mes-
sage.41 4 Therefore, the collector must be keen about articulating
411. The major contention about § 1692g is the conflict between the statutory thirty-
day period for the consumer to dispute the debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000), and the
collector's demands, which suggests that the consumer may not really have thirty days to
act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1999) (re-
questing prompt payment); Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998)
(demanding immediate payment); Russell, 74 F.3d at 32 (demanding payment within ten
days); Talbot v. CC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846, 853-54 (W.D. Va. 1999) (de-
manding payment within ten days).
412. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000).
413. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
414. The ideal solution is for the collector's initial contact to be in writing. That will
solve the problem inherent in the current language. The collector can include the valida-
tion language in the "initial communication," but there is no requirement for a writing if
one accepts the current definition of "communication." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(2), 1692g(a)
(2000).
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its message without diluting the statutory notice. It is a challenge
that many collectors have been unable to meet.
One way of avoiding the conflict is for the collector to simplify
the details about the debt in the initial written communication
that bears the validation notice.415 The collector should give the
details of the transaction, provide the statutory notice, and then
wait twenty-one days for the consumer to act.416 The collector will
not be able to make any demands under this scenario, for the
purpose of this initial communication is to apprize the consumer
of the basic details and then give him time to dispute the debt
within the set period.417 If the consumer remains silent, then the
collector is free to resume its collection activities.41 Although the
present statute gives the consumer thirty days to register his ob-
jections, it is reasonable to reduce that period to twenty-one days
if the collector cannot continue its collection efforts in the interim.
This approach would reflect a change from the current procedure
that does allow the collector to continue its work during the thirty
days that the consumer is considering the situation." 9 This pro-
posed scheme takes away the incentive for the collector to craft
language that competes with the statutory formula for disputing
the debt."' The consumer gets one clear message; the collector al-
415. The objective is merely to let the consumer know about the debt and to give him
enough time to decide on his next step.
416. By keeping with this formula, a collector will avoid claims that its collection lan-
guage contradicts and/or overshadows the validation notice, while at the same time in-
forming the consumer about the debt. In Bartlett v. Heibl, the court attempted to reconcile
the consumer's right to dispute the debt with the collector's right to continue its collection
efforts. It set forth a redacted letter that was intended to serve as a "safe harbor" for col-
lectors, which stated:
The law does not require me to wait until the end of the thirty-day period be-
fore suing you to collect this debt. If, however, you request proof of the debt or
the name and address of the original creditor within the thirty-day period
that begins with your receipt of this letter, the law requires me to suspend
my efforts (through litigation or otherwise) to collect the debt until I mail the
requested information to you.
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1997).
That reconciliation language goes a long way towards avoiding the problem. Neverthe-
less, the consumer does not really have thirty days to question the debt. He must act much
faster than that if he wants to avoid the collector's contact.
417. This would provide a true thirty-day dispute period, but at least the consumer
would know about the collector's allegations.
418. It is to be noted, however, that the consumer's failure to dispute the debt is not to
be construed as the consumer's admission of liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c) (2000); NCLC,
supra note 89, § 5.7.4.
419. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
420. There is no shortage of competing language in collection letters. See, e.g., Johnson
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leges the existence of a debt, gives the details, and leaves the con-
sumer with opportunity to say his piece. There is more than
enough time for the collector to pursue the consumer if the con-
sumer says nothing or, if he says something, after the collector
verifies the debt.421
Another part of the puzzle relates to the ambiguity in § 1692g,
which focuses on the collector's ability to provide the details of the
debt in the initial communication to the consumer. 2 The diffi-
culty here lies with the definition of "communication."4 23 If the
collector can orally convey information about the debt, there is a
real problem with allowing a collector to convey all the informa-
tion listed in § 1692g(a) in that fashion.424 It is necessary for Con-
gress to clarify this section so that there is no doubt what it in-
tended here.
Even if Congress does not amend the statute to give the con-
sumer a twenty-one day breather, a collector should have an obli-
v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1999) (demanding prompt payment
stated a cause of action); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that a collection letter with conflicting deadlines violated the FDCPA); Rus-
sell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a collection letter
warning that collection would be posted to the consumer's files unless payment was made
within ten days violated the FDCPA); Rhoades v. W. Va. Credit Bureau Reporting Servs.,
96 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (finding that a letter demanding immediate
payment in large type overshadowed and contradicted the validation notice); Talbot v. GC
Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846 (W.D. Va. 1999) (finding that a collection letter de-
manding that the consumer pay in ten days to avoid more collection fees overshadowed the
validation notice).
421. The courts and the FTC have taken the position that the current thirty-day period
for disputing the debt is not a grace period within which the collector must suspend collec-
tion, but rather a dispute period within which the consumer may dispute the debt. See
Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at
501; Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991); 2001 FTC
ANN. REP., supra note 24. In its 2001 annual report, the FTC suggested that Congress
should clarify the statutory language to emphasize the point. See 2001 FTC ANN. REP.,
supra note 24, at 11. But the FTC was careful to point out that "[tihe clarification should
include a caveat that the collection activity should not overshadow or be inconsistent with
the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt specified by Section 809(a)." Id.
That is precisely why the dispute period should be turned into a grace period. There would
then be no quarrel about contraction or overshadowing with respect to the validation no-
tice.
422. See id. § 1692g.
423. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000). The FDCPA defines "communication" as "the con-
veying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium." Id.
424. The subsection contains five paragraphs. See § 1692g(a)(1)-(5). It seems unlikely
that a collector would have the patience to convey carefully the information covered there,
and it would be even more unlikely that the consumer could absorb it within the short pe-
riod of time involved in an "oral" communication.
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gation to inform the consumer that any dispute of the debt will
bring an immediate halt to the collector's pursuit until the collec-
tor verifies the debt." 5 The current provision requires the collec-
tor to cease its collection of the debt under these circumstances,
but it does not require the collector to inform the consumer of this
fact.426 The more information the consumer has, the better off he
is in terms of his relationship with the collector. This is an oppor-
tunity for the statute to be fairer to the consumer.
A collector should also be required to tell the consumer that if
the consumer wishes the collector to cease communication, the
collector will do so.427 This is not an unreasonable requirement,
given the fact the statute already requires the collector to give no-
tice of the consumer's right to dispute the debt.42 The consumer
must understand, however, that a premature request to cease
communication may hasten legal action that may be avoided if
the parties are still in contact. Nevertheless, the consumer should
know that he has the choice.
425. Compare id. § 1692g(a)(3)-(5), with id. § 1692g(b).
426. Id § 1692g(b).
427. When taken together with a revised § 1692g(b), this notice of the consumer's right
to demand that the collector cease communicating would be a powerful weapon for the
consumer, particularly when the consumer is convinced that the debt is not valid.
428. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
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